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Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Denial of the Franchise to Indi-
viduals with Criminal Records
In 1961 Robert A. Stephens, a resident of New Jersey, was con-
victed of larceny ofdan automobile in the County Court of Essex County,
New Jersey. He received a sentence of probation for three years. On
May 27, 1968, Mr. Stephens registered as a voter with the Essex County
Board of Elections and was thereafter notified that his name had been
stricken from the voting lists because of his prior conviction for larceny.
Election officials acted under a 1948 New Jersey statute' that provided
for the automatic loss of voting rights of those convicted of various and
sundry crimes.
Desiring to vote and otherwise qualified to vote in the November
3, 1970, general election for federal and state candidates, Stephens
brought an action before a three-judge district court seeking an injunc-
tion restraining the Superintendent of Elections of New Jersey from
enforcing the statute. He argued that his disenfranchisement deprived
him of the equal protection of the laws.
In Stephens v. Yeomans 2 the three-judge court held that state voter
qualification laws were indeed covered by the fourteenth amendment
and that to pass muster under the equal protection clause all state laws
disenfranchising resident citizens must bear a rational relationship to
the achievement of a discernible and permissible state goal.3 The court
determined that the purpose of the New Jersey Legislature in passing
the statute was to insure and preserve the purity of the state electoral
process. This determination was based on the facts that the New Jersey
Legislature derived the power to pass this specific statute from language
'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (1964) provides: "No one shall have the right of suffrage-
(4) Who shall hereafter be convicted of the crime of larceny of the value of $200.00 or more, unless
pardoned or restored by law to the right of suffrage ....
2327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970).
VId. at 1187. Although the court purported to be utilizing the rigorous equal protection test
demanded when a fundamental right is involved, see. e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), it
couched the standard in terms of the traditional and more lenient test, see, e.g., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Thus it required only a "rational relationship" between the
avowed state purpose and the legislation instead of a showing of a "compelling state interest" in
it. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See generally Cox, Foreword
to The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 94-95 (1967).
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in the state constitutional article on suffrage4 and that the statute itself
was located in the title on elections. Finding no rational relationship
between the crimes conviction of which would disqualify and the state's
purpose of protecting the ballot box, the court struck down the statute
as unconstitutional for not meeting the "exacting standard of precision
required by the equal protection clause for a selective distribution of the
franchise." '5 The Superintendent of Elections was then ordered to restore
plaintiff's name to the voter list in time to vote in the next general
election.
The Stephens court, in basing its holding on the fourteenth amend-
ment, pointed out the disagreement among constitutional scholars as to
the applicability of the equal protection clause to state voter qualifica-
tion laws. The equal protection clause is contained in the first section
of the fourteenth amendment and does not specifically mention voting
rights.6 On the other hand, the second section of the fourteenth amend-
ment speaks expressly to protection of voting rights.7 Since these two
sections were obviously passed simultaneously, the argument exists that
only the second section was intended to pertain to state voting laws.8
Justice Harlan has recently articulated this argument, and interpreta-
tions contemporaneous with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
lend strong support to his position.'
However, as the Stephens court noted, this view is not currently
accepted by the Supreme Court." In fact, the Court has often used the
equal protection clause in its attempts to eliminate voter discrimination
'Article 2, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Legislature may pass
laws to deprive persons of the right of suffrage who shall be convicted of such crimes as it may
designate. Any person so deprived, when pardoned or otherwise designate. Any person so deprived,
when pardoned or otherwise restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall again enjoy that right."
5327 F. Supp. at 1188.
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I: "No state shall. . . deny to any person within itsjurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
'U.S. Co sr. amend. XIV, § 2:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respec-
tive numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote . . .[in certain elections] is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
'See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'ld. at 626-631.
"See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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based upon race," wealth,' 2 or place of residence. 3 The main purpose
of the second section is to sanction states' engaging in voter discrimina-
tion by reducing their representation in Congress. Thus, if the second
section were the sole touchstone in the realm of voting rights, then
reduction in representation would be the only possible remedy for depri-
vation of such rights. This unduly restrictive interpretation of remedies
was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved a dam-
ages action against Texas election commissioners for violation of the
fourteenth amendment in denying the right to vote because of race. 4
The Stephens court considered this an overwhelming rejection of the
Harlan argument that the second section completely precludes the pro-
tection of voting rights from any other source.
Anticipating this reaction, the New Jersey Superintendent of Elec-
tions argued, as have several state attorneys-general while defending
statutes denying the vote to those convicted of certain crimes, that even
if the first section of the fourteenth amendment applies to state voter
laws, it is nonetheless limited to some extent by the language of the
second section.' The sanction outlined in the second section specifically
exempts the situation in which the franchise is denied participants "in
rebellion or other crime." Since the second section seemingly approves
of this particular discrimination, such discrimination must be beyond
the reach of the equal protection clause as well. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found this argument persuasive in Green v. Board
of Elections, in which a New York statute disenfranchising all felons
was upheld.'s-Judge Friendly, writing for the court, found that the rejec-
tion of Harlan's position by the Supreme Court in no way precluded this
interpretation, "especially in the light of the Justices' frequent and con-
sistent statements approving voting disqualification for felony."' 9 How-
"E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
12E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
'"E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
'1327 F. Supp. at 1185.
"See, e.g., Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), affd per curiam, 396 U.S.
12(1969).
7380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
"See generally W. Crumpler, Research Paper on Administration of Criminal Justice, May,
1971 (unpublished paper in possession of author).
"Id. at 452. The Green court, in approving the disqualification of felons, stated, "The framers
of the Amendment . . . could hardly have intended the general language of § I to outlaw a
discrimination which § 2 expressly allowed without the penalty of reduced representation." Id.
However, the court earlier in the opinion had admitted that "[t]here may. . . be crimes. . which
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ever, the Stephens court also rejected this argument, concluding that
since it was "clear that the entire section imposes no limitation on
section 1, it can hardly be argued that the exception or proviso relied
on in Green in section 2 was intended to impose such a limitation."' 0
The court felt that the express exception to the second section in no way
permeated other parts of the Constitution. The framers of the four-
teenth amendment apparently thought the remedy of reduced represen-
tation inappropriate if states denied criminals the right to vote.' To
apply the exception across the board would distort the framers' words
beyond their true meaning.
After so artfully construing the fourteenth amendment, the court
sought the rational link22 between the legislation and its avowedly per-
missible purpose. In examining the reasons the state might have in
disenfranchising convicted criminals, the court ignored the oft-cited one
of additional punishment;23 instead the court concentrated on the pro-
tection of the electoral process, since the actions of the New Jersey
legislature clearly were directed towards this purpose. The preservation
of the purity of the ballot box was first recognized in a frequently quoted
Alabama case, Washingtrn v. State,2 and has been recognized by many
courts as being a valid state consideration.2 5 However, the Stephens
court determined that the New Jersey statute did nothing to enhance the
purity of the process because of a "remarkable contrast in treatment ' 20
of different classes of crime. For example, embezzlers and most defrau-
ders, including persons convicted of income tax fraud, remained eligible
to vote; however, those convicted of larceny were ineligible. Thieves
were disenfranchised but receivers of stolen property were not.2 Such
randomness of disqualification seemed totally "irrational and inconsist-
are of such minor significance that exclusion for their commission might raise . . . a substantial
constitutional question at least if we looked at § I of the Fourteenth Amendment alone." Id. Thus,
Green can fairly be read as holding only that the disqualification of felons'does not deny equal
protection and not that the qualification is exempt from the penumbra of equal protection.
2327 F. Supp. at 1187.
2'1d. at 1185.
221d. at 1187; see note 3 supra.
21See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); State ex ret. Barrett -!. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237,
175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).
2175 Ala. 582 (1884).
21See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048
(1968); Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966); State ex rel. Barrett
v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).




ent" to the court and could not be explained. Though possibly designed
to protect a permissible state purpose, the statute had no rational rela-
tion to the accomplishment of this purpose. 8
As mentioned earlier, a second general reason often given for disen-
franchising those convicted of crime is additional punishment for the
crime. The punishment argument is open to attack on two grounds.
First, most state constitutions do not provide for disfranchisement as
part of permissible state punishment;29 therefore, such an argument
could be attacked as being repugnant to the state constitution. Secondly,
such additional punishment could be attacked as "cruel and unusual"
under the eighth amendment. In Trop v. Dulles,31 the Supreme Court,
though finding citizenship not subject to the general powers of the na-
tional government and therefore not susceptible to divestment under
these powers, said that the eighth amendment would preclude a penal
divestment of citizenship. In dictum, however, the Court dealt the pun-
ishment argument a blow by stating that voter disqualification for con-
viction of crime was nonpenal 3l in nature because its purpose was to
designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting.32 Notwithstand-
ing this dictum, an analogy might be constructed between citizenship
and the right to vote that would place the removal of voting rights in
the realm of cruel and unusual punishment if states proceed on the
punishment theory.
The Stephens court seemed to recognize the possible existence of a
legal justification for restriction of the franchise; it did not propose the
outright enfranchisement of all persons with past criminal records.
However, no workable criteria to aid legislatures in drafting statutes
that do not violate the equal protection clause were set forth. If a
standard had been enunciated, perhaps the Stephens court would have
adopted the criteria proposed by the California Supreme Court when it
proclaimed a California statute impermissibly broad if it were inter-
preted as disenfranchising all felons. In Otsuka v. Hite : the California
court said that if a state's purpose is in fact to protect the purity of the
z2Id.
'Contra, DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2.
-356 U.S. 86 (1958).
"Statutes have been considered nonpenal if they impose a disability not to punish, but to
accomplish some other legitimate purpose. Id. at 96.
32But see DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2, which specifically provides that the legislature may deprive
a convicted criminal of the right to vote as further punishment.
164 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
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ballot box, in drafting a statute that will survive close equal protection
scrutiny, a legislature should focus on the nature of the crime itself; it
must determine whether the particular crime is such that one who has
committed it may reasonably be considered a threat to the integrity of
the elective process, and whether disqualification of the convicted per-
son can reasonably be said to assure that he will not defile the electoral
process. In short, disqualifying classifications must focus primarily on
crimes involving a threat to the electoral process. The court concluded
that it would uphold a California constitutional provision 4 only if it
were interpreted as disqualifying as voters those convicted of crimes
involving moral corruption and dishonesty. 35 While Judge Friendly in
Green had placed great weight on the frequent references 3 by the
Supreme Court to disenfranchisement of felons,"1 the Otsuka court
dismissed this as "mere illustrative dicta." 3
As desirable as the Otsuka result might appear, the limitation to
crimes involving dishonesty and moral corruption considers only the
state's interest and not the interest of the disenfranchised. The Supreme
Court, in Williams v. Rhodes,31 felt that "in determining whether or
not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged
by the classification."
In applying this balancing formula to state laws disenfranchising
criminals, it is important to examine the validity of the state's reasoning
"sCAL. CONST. art. 11, § I.
-The plaintiff in Otsuka had been convicted during World War II of violating the Selective
Service Act, and the court considered this crime not indicative of the fact that its perpetrator would
be likely to injure the elective process if he were given his suffrage. 64 Cal. 2d at 605, 414 P.2d at
418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
3'See. e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
"For two cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the disenfranchisement of lawbreakers,
see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 339 (1890) and Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). The Otsuka
court distinguished these cases from those denying the right to vote because of a prior conviction.
In Murphy and Davis the plaintiffs had been disenfranchised because they were currently practicing
polygamy in violation of statutes forbidding those who did so to vote. The Supreme Court in
Murphy also recognizes this distinction: "The disfranchisement operates upon the existing state
and condition of the person and not upon a past offence . . . . He alone is deprived of his vote
who, when he offers to register, is then in the state and condition of a bigamist or a polygamist,
or is then actually cohabiting with more than one woman." Id. at 43.
164 Cal. 2d at 605, 414 P.2d at 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 291.




in drafting the classification. If a convicted criminal is upon completion
of sentence denied the right to vote it is obviously because the legislature
feels he will be likely to sell his vote or cast it in some dishonest manner.
If such a likelihood is realistic, then it must also be strongly possible
that a convicted criminal will commit other types of election crimes that
have nothing to do with the actual casting of the ballot. Thus even if it
is accepted that an ex-convict is more likely than other voters to vote
dishonestly, denial of the vote makes a very small contribution to the
overall purpose of protecting the ballot box. When balanced against the
fundamental right of each citizen to vote, the conclusion should be in
favor of giving the franchise back to those persons who are returning
to society after having paid their debt.
41
Under this balancing formula it is likely that both New York's
"felony" disqualification and California's limitation to crimes involving
dishonesty and moral corruption might be struck down under the equal
protection clause. It also raises the question of whether any state statute
that disqualifies ex-convicts can pass equal protection muster. One other
possible standard that would disenfranchise only those convicted to
election law violations has been proposed.12 Again, such a standard
might make a small contribution toward preserving the purity of the
process,4 3 but this should be outweighed by a desire of the state to
release its prisoners to society on terms of reasonable trust and confid-
ence.
44
In addition to an interest in the purity of the election process and
an interest in punishing criminals, a state has an interest in rehabilitat-
ing criminals and assimilating them back into society upon their release
from prison. It is doubtful that the state is injured by allowing ex-
convicts to vote, and the restoration of voting rights upon release would
support the rehabilitation of the ex-offender by giving him a greater
feeling of restoration as a full-fledged citizen." Assimilation into society
"F. WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION 354 (1923).
12See Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on States' Power to Disfranchise
Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 297, 315 (1967).
"To disenfranchise only those convicted of election crimes in order to preserve the purity of
the ballot box carries the stigma of additional punishment in that it smacks of the eye for an eye,
tooth for a tooth penalties generally attributed to Old Testament penology. See also Note,
Constitutional Law-Disenfranchisement of Felons-Felon's Challenge to State Law Disfranchis-
ing Felons Held Not to Raise Substantial Federai Question, 3 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
REV. 423, 425 (1968).
"F. WINES, supra note 43, at 354.
'IS. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 622 (1963).
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is not promoted by a device for maintaining social and political distance.
If the prisoner is worthy of being released to the community he should
be made to feel that he is ready to rejoin society as a participant and
not as an outsider.46
Though most states do not automatically restore a prisoner's civil
rights upon release, statutes provide for this restoration upon pardon or
completion of a probationary period. The concept of pardoning and
procedures for obtaining it vary from state to state,47 but in any event
unless voting rights and other civil liberties are restored automatically
upon completion of sentence, the convict faces the degradation of being
without his civil rights at least for a time after having paid his debt to
society.
48
Decisions like Stephens go a long way toward extending full equal
11E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 651-52 (7th ed. 1966).
J'Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, 1952 NAT'L PROBATION &
PAROLE Ass'N YEARBOOK 86, 97.
-'North Carolina provides for disenfranchisement in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (1972):
The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to register or vote in this State:
(3) Persons who have been convicted, or who have confessed their guilt in open
court, upon indictment, of any crime the punishment for which is now or may
hereafter be imprisonment in the State's prison, unless he shall have had his rights
of citizenship restored in the manner prescribed by law.
North Carolina statutes dealing with restoration of citizenship are found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-
I to -3 (1972):
§ 13.1. Restoration of citizenship.-Any person convicted of a crime, whereby the
rights of citizenship are forfeited, shall have such rights restored upon compliance with
one of the following conditions:
(I) The Department of Correction at the time of release recommends restora-
tion of citizenship;
(2) Two years have elapsed since release by the Department of Correction,
including probation or parole, during which time the individual has not been
convicted of a criminal offense of any state or of the federal government;
(3) Or upon receiving an unconditional pardon.
§ 13-2. Procedure for restoration.-The restoration procedure shall consist of the
taking of an oath by such person before any judge of the General Court of Justice in
Wake County or in the county where he resides or in which he was last convicted, to
the effect that said person has complied with the provisions of § 13-1, and that he will
support and abide by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion and laws of North Carolina not inconsistent therewith.
§ 13-3. Assistance by appropriate government personnel. The Department of
Correction, the Department of Juvenile Correction, the Probation Commission, the
Board of Paroles and other appropriate State and county officials shall cooperate with
and assist such person in securing any information required by any judge prior to
administering the oath required by this section.
[Vol. 50
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protection of the law to those members of society who are stigmatized
by a past criminal convictions. Although the case stopped short of
declaring that all convicted criminals have a right to the franchise after
release and offered no workable standard for legislatures to follow,
standards might be fashioned from the law available in the area. How-
ever, a state can best serve its own interest and at the same time be free
from any possible violation of equal protection by restoring suffrage to
all prisoners upon completion of sentence. The state, of all institutions,
should not let a citizen's conviction of a crime be prima facie evidence
of his electoral dishonesty.
CHARLES H. CRANFORD
Constitutional Law-School Law-Restrictions on the Infliction of Cor-
poral Punishment: Spoiling the Rod
In the past decade courts have begun to recognize the substantive
and procedural constitutional rights of students who attend public
schools' and to attempt to balance those rights against the effective
maintenance of control and discipline in the educational context. For-
merly courts had vested broad discretion in school authorities to control
and discipline students,2 but with the application of constitutional rights
in the school context3 it has become necessary to examine the discipli-
nary procedures of schools, including possible constitutional limitations
upon the infliction of corporal punishment.'
'See generally Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 619
(1970); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 358 (1971);
Note, Emerging Rights of High School Students: The Law Comes of Age, 23 U. FLA. L. REV.
549 (1971).
2See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924):
[C]ollege authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any regula-
tion . . . which a parent could make . . . and . . . courts have no more authority to
interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family.
'See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). In Tinker the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of substantial interference with school activities, the wearing of armbands
by students was protected by the first amendment. In the landmark case of Dixon, the Fifth Circuit
held that due process requires notice and some opportunity for a hearing before students can be
expelled for misconduct.
'For the purposes of this note, corporal punishment is defined as the intentional infliction of
physical pain subsequent to misbehavior for the purpose of deterring future misbehavior. It does
not refer to the use of reasonable force as a means of self-defense or for the protection of other
children.
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In Sims v. Board of Education,' a basic challenge to the infliction
of corporal punishment was made. There was no allegation that the
infliction of the punishment was arbitrary or discriminatory,6 that the
purpose of the punishment was to inhibit the free exercise of a specific
first amendment right, or that the particular punishment of the plaintiff
was excessive so as to be cruel and unusual. Plaintiff alleged7 essentially
that "corporal punishment [denies procedural due process because it]
constitutes summary punishment without affording an opportunity for
notice, hearing, or right of representation"' and that" 'corporal punish-
ment is, ipso facto, cruel and unusual'" in violation of the eighth
amendment. The court rejected both contentions. 0
The concept of "cruel and unusual" punishment" is one of the most
flexible in the Constitution since it must be interpreted in light of the
contemporary values of society or, as the Supreme Court has said,
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 2 The standard that has been
developed to determine the applicability of the eighth amendment is a
moral one-whether the punishment is uncivilized'3 or "of such a char-
acter as to shock the conscience or violate fundamental fairness."' 4
Because of the subjective character of the standard, establishing that
corporal punishment or any punishment is "uncivilized" or "indecent"
is difficult, but the history of a particular form of punishment as well
as its application in other contexts is important.
While corporal punishment historically could be applied legally to
a wife by her husband, to apprentices by their masters, and to sailors
and convicts, the school situation is the last area of society where it is
1329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
VId. at 685.
7While plaintiff alleged violations of substantive due process, equal protection, and the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 681, this note will discuss only
the most viable allegations-the denial of procedural due process and the violation of the eighth
amendment.
1329 F. Supp. at 681.
'Id. at 690.
IOld.
""[C]ruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This
prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
12Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
131d.
"Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1969).




still extensively used by the state. The anomaly that corporal punish-
ment can still be inflicted only upon students has been criticized by
courts,'" and the use of corporal punishment to control student behavior
has been attacked by many educators.17 The elimination of corporal
punishment in areas other than education is indicative of the general
attitude of society towards corporal punishment and relevant to the
determination that corporal punishment violates the concept of dignity
and the civilized standards of contemporary society.
There is also important judicial authority for the assertion that
corporal punishment in secondary schools violates the eighth amend-
ment. The case of Jackson v. Bishop 8 is, for example, highly relevant,
although the court in Sims declared Jackson to be distinguishable 9
because it involved the infliction of corporal punishment upon Arkansas
prisoners rather than upon students. In Jackson Judge (now Justice)
Blackmun stated that corporal punishment "offends contemporary con-
cepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization which
we profess to possess. '20 This broad characterization of corporal punish-
ment as offensive to contemporary values cannot be ignored.
The recognition of constitutional restraints in the context of educa-
tion requires that courts no longer rely upon the broad discretion of
school authorities as justification for denying the rights of students. It
is not sufficient to declare, as did the Sims court, that the court would
not "substitute" its judgment for that of the school authorities as to
what was appropriate to maintain discipline.22 In addition, since it has
been determined that children are possessed of the fundamental rights
of the Constitution, childhood alone is no longer an adequate basis for
denying rights to which an individual would otherwise be entitled; 3 a
determination that corporal punishment is cruel and unusual in one
context should result, in the absence of substantial countervailing rea-
sons, in a similar determination when that punishment is applied to
children. The historical diminution of corporal punishment as well as
its treatment in the Jackson opinion militated towards a determination
"See Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853).
"Note, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV., supra note 15, at 584.
1404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
1329 F. Supp. at 689.
2404 F.2d at 579.
"See cases cited note 3 supra.
"329 F. Supp. at 690.
"See In re Gault, 378 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967). Contra, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968).
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that corporal punishment in secondary schools violated the eighth
amendment.
It was also asserted in Sims that the imposition of the punishment
without the procedural safeguards of notice, hearing, or right of counsel
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The
concept of due process, like the "cruel and unusual" provision of the
eighth amendment, is a very flexible provision of the Constitution since
the particular procedures necessary to comply with the due process
clause will depend upon the total circumstances and interests of all the
parties involved." In school the student is entitled to "the observance
of procedural safeguards commensurate with the severity of the disci-
pline,' 2 and so the nature of the proceeding required will depend in part
upon the extent of injury to the student. In addition to the character of
the injury to the student, the importance of corporal punishment as well
as the effect of a particular proceeding upon the effective use of the
corporal punishment must be considered. Finally, the availability of
alternatives to procedural safeguards that adequately protect the inter-
est of the student and guard against the potential abuse of authority are
relevant to the determination of what is required by the due process
clause.
In cases involving expulsion or indefinite suspension a formal hear-
ing has been required? The severe social and economic consequences
of an expulsion are the basis of the requirement of a hearing," and since
the consequences of corporal punishment are substantially less severe
presumably a formal hearing would not be required by due process.
Beyond that initial determination, the potential extent of the injury to
the student as a result of corporal punishment cannot be determinative
211[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The actions of school officials are state action under the
fourteenth amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
The procedural safeguards which may be required by due process can inclkude notice, a
hearing, the right of representation by counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to cross-
examination. The inclusion of one does not, of course, necessarily require the inclusion of others.
See R. PHAY, SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS 22-30 (NOLPE
Monograph No. 3, 1971).
2'Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
2 'Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
2'Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
2Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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of what procedures are required 9 since the exact effect of corporal
punishment upon the student cannot be known. 0 However, although
corporal punishment can be characterized as minor in comparison to
other possible punishments, in the absence of countervailing circum-
stances some form of informal hearing should be required-even if it is
nothing more than an opportunity for the student to explain his conduct
to a neutral party.3
The burden on the effective use of corporal punishment that might
exist as a result of procedural safeguards was a primary factor in the
decision of the Sims court that no procedures were required by the due
process clause. The court took judicial notice that "the purposes to be
served by corporal punishment would be long since passed if formal
notice, hearing and representation were required, ' 32 and the assertion
is undoubtedly true. The imposition of formal procedures would make
the use of corporal punishment practically impossible. However, alter-
natives of less burdensome procedures that still protect the student are
available so that the complete absence of procedural safeguards is not
necessary to the effective use of corporal punishment. Procedural re-
quirements such as administration of the punishment only by the princi-
pal or the presence of an adult other than the party inflicting the punish-
ment do exist,33 and the effective use of the punishment has not been
reduced by these procedures. The purpose of such procedures has been
primarily the protection of the school official from tort liability,34 and
the addition of similar procedures the purpose of which is the protection
of the student from arbitrary or excessive punishment presumably
would be of no greater burden. For example, the requirement that the
"lt is necessary to distinguish between potential psychological or educational detriment to the
student that may result from corporal punishment and potential injury to the student as a result
of the abuse of the privilege to inflict the punishment. While the potential injury to the student
cannot be known in either circumstance, only the unknown character of the former cannot affect
the application of procedural safeguards. The unknown character of the latter strengthens the case
for such safeguards. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
"lt has been argued that corporal punishment produces adverse psychological reactions,
increases delinquency, and disrupts the learning process. Note, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB.
L. REV., supra note 15, at 584.
31Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 583 (1971).
12329 F. Supp. at 683.
"See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (Supp. 1970): "In cases where corporal punish-
ment is deemed necessary, it shall be administered by the Chief School Officer or by the principal
in the presence of another adult."
3'Buss, supra note 31, at 583.
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punishment be inflicted by one other than the accuser or only after
authorization from a superior would minimize the danger of excessive-
ness from anger that is inherent in immediate punishment, and the
purposes of corporal punishment would still be achieved.
In addition to the burden that formal procedures might have on the
effective use of corporal punishment, the availability of alternatives to
procedural safeguards that protect the student against wrongful inflic-
tion of corporal punishment is important in determining what proce-
dures are required by due process. In the teacher-pupil relationship, the
deterrent effect of possible civil liability of a teacher for a wrongful
infliction of corporal punishment exists as a protection against abuse of
the common-law privilege to inflict the punishment.3 5 However, the
effect on the teacher's behavior of the actual legal consequences of
wrongful infliction is minimal, primarily because of the restrictions that
have been placed by courts or by statute upon recovery from a teacher.
In North Carolina it is necessary to show not only unreasonableness in
the infliction of the punishment" but also that the infliction was mali-
cious or resulted in foreseeable permanent injury.3 1 In other states there
must be "gross abuse" before liability will be incurred,38 or there may
exist a presumption of the reasonableness of the teacher's conduct.39
The result of these limitations is that the student is legally protected
only from an extremely abusive infliction of the punishment. In addi-
tion, the civil liability of teachers only relates to the nature of the
infliction and is seldom dependent upon whether the student's conduct
in fact warranted such punishment. Consequently, although it can be
argued that the potential civil liability of a teacher does protect against
excessive use of corporal punishment, it seldom guarantees that the
student in fact engaged in the behavior that resulted in the punishment
or that such behavior warranted that punishment. Therefore, potential
civil liability is not an adequate substitute for the guarantees of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.
Due process is an elusive concept that is dependent upon balancing
3The deterrent effect of actual civil liability should be distinguished from the deterrent effect
of the threat of being sued and the comcommitant cost of defense, loss of reputation, etc. The extent
of the latter is not known, but it has been recognized to exist. Miller, Resort to Corporal Punish-
ment in Enforcing School Discipline, I SYR. L. REV. 247, 265 (1949).
nN.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-146 (1966).
31Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 208, 47 S.E. 421, 422 (1904).
3'E.g.. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3757 (1968).31E.g., Drake v. Thomas, 310 III. App. 57, 64, 33 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1941).
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all the factors involved in a given situation, and in the case of corporal
punishment it is necessary to consider the potential abuse of the privi-
lege to inflict the punishment as well as the burden of procedures and
the potential harm to the student. An Indiana court has observed that
"[T]he practice of corporal punishment has an inherent proneness to
abuse,"4 and in view of the control that a teacher exercises over stu-
dents, the frequency or severity of the punishment cannot be controlled
by defining permissible punishment as that which is "reasonable." In
Jackson Justice Blackmun noted that such regulations are easily cir-
cumvented and that where "power to punish is granted to persons in
lower levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and natural
difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power."41
Requiring authorization prior to the infliction of the punishment
or requiring that the punishment be inflicted only in the presence of
another adult would go far to eliminate the potential abuse of corporal
punishment. The imposition of such minimal procedures in the context
of secondary schools would not unduly burden school authorities in their
attempt to maintain discipline and control among their students but
would be an important step in guaranteeing the full constitutional rights
of those who attend public schools.
JOHN C. LILLIE
Criminal Law-Reflections: Insanity, Bifurcation, Burden of Proof
Can an insane person "intend to commit a crime"? May the state
exclude evidence of his mental disorder at the trial of his guilt? May it
require him to disprove his sanity during the separate trial of that issue?
The threshold question may be answered in the affirmative: In some
superficial sense, at least, insane persons intend the crimes they commit.
Yet the mens rea required for a crime such as homicide has commonly
been supposed to connote something more profound.'
This note will examine these and other questions as singularly high-
lighted in the context of the bifurcated trial procedure. Recent Wiscon-
"Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853).
"1404 F.2d at 579.
'See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comments 1-4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) and
authorities cited therein.
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sin cases answering each of the above questions will provide the perspec-
tive for our examination.
In Sprague v. State' the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. During an argument, he had pushed his wife down the basement
stairs and then had struck her several times with a nearby board, killing
her. At trial the sole defense offered was that defendant had experienced
a psychomotor epileptic seizure3 which had rendered him incapable of
forming the specific intent required for first degree murder. Defendant
elected to be tried in a bifurcated procedure, thereby gaining the benefit
of the Model Penal Code definition of insanity but assuming the burden
of proof on that issue. During the trial to determine guilt, medical
testimony and electroencephalograms tending to substantiate his claim
of epileptic seizure were excluded, as was testimony tending to rebut the
contention. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found these rulings proper4
and thereby approved an exclusionary rule which substantially removes
the issue of mens rea from that portion of trial at which guilt and degree
of offense are determined. This was done despite Wisconsin's statutory
definitions of homicide, which require "the mental purpose to take the
life of another human being" for first degree murder5 and "conduct
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life"' for second degree
murder.
Sprague is the latest decision in what has been termed "the Wiscon-
sin experiment, ' 7 which was begun in 1966 in State v. Schoffner. There,
defendant claimed that he was a paranoid schizophrenic and that he
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
252 Wis. 2d 89, 187 N.W.2d 784 (1971).
3W. NEUSTATTER, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER AND CRIME 123 (1957) describes a psychomo.
tor epileptic seizure. The author says the "fit" is "a peculiar psychological state" in which
[t]he patient apparently lapses into a dreamy condition where he feels temporarily
abstracted rather as if he were in a trance. . . . Post epileptic automatism sometimes
follows psychomotor epilepsy. . . . It is characterised by the performance of a number
of quite automatic acts, which may, nevertheless, appear purposeful to an observer.
Id. at 123.
152 Wis. 2d at __, 187 N.W.2d at 788.
'WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958).
I1d. § 940.02.
'Note, Criminal Law-Burden of Prooffor Insanity Defense, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 969, 977.
'31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966). M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843):
[T]o establish a defense on the ground'of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
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of the law, although admittedly he understood the nature and quality
of his acts and was able to differentiate between right and wrong. The
court divided evenly on the question whether the M'Naghten test of
insanity' or the alternative posed by the Model Penal Code0 would be
applied." In the ensuing compromise, the Schoffner court created an
optional procedure whereby a defendant could, as Schoffner and
Sprague did assume the burden of proof as to his insanity and gain the
benefit of the Model Penal Code definition of insanity, a test that is
more liberal than the M'Naghten rule. Moreover, the Schoffner
decision allowed a defendant to contend in the alternative that he did
not do the act and that if he did he was insane. Sprague failed to take
advantage of this option.
The exclusionary question raised in Sprague, received its first con-
sideration in Curl v. State."2 In Curl the trial court had admitted, at the
initial guilt phase of the trial, testimony showing that on the day of the
crime defendant had consumed seventeen ounces of whiskey, twelve
Librium pills, and sixteen Darvon pills. Expert testimony showed that
such consumption would have rendered Curl incapable of forming the
specific intent required for the crime of burglary. However, the trial
court excluded evidence that Curl had been hospitalized as a paranoid
schizophrenic some years earlier and that Librium had been prescribed
for this disorder. In upholding the conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court said:
To bifurcate a trial is to separate completely the issue of lack of
accountability due to insanity from the issue of whether the crime was
committed. If the testimony of earlier hospitalizations and mental
condition . . . is also material on the issue of guilt, there would be no
reason to hold split trials.
. . . In the law the dividing line. . . is the test of sanity, whatever
the legal definition of [this term] may be or come to be.'3
The language of Curl, sweeping well beyond its factual basis, was
applied in State v. Hebard.4 The Hebard defendant denied committing
I
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961) inquires whether the defen-
dant lacks either a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or the substan-
tial capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.
"31 Wis. 2d at 415, 143 N.W.2d at 464-65. The author of the opinion candidly recounted the
division of the court and the way in which the issue was resolved.
"40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77 (1968).
"Id. at 484-86, 162 N.W.2d at 82-83.
"50 Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W. 2d 156 (1971).
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the crime and claimed on appeal that the exclusion during the guilt
phase of his trial of evidence of his mental condition was constitutionally
impermissible. Instead of limiting Curl to the reading its facts seemed
to require and holding that the exclusion of the evidence of mental
condition was erroneous, the court appeared to feel the entire Schoffner
procedure was threatened. The court felt that "[i]f the position of
[Hebard] were upheld, more would be involved than a complete reversal
of the reasoning of the Curl Case. The entire matter of permitting
bifurcating trials would have to be re-examined."' 5 This assertion clearly
cannot be justified on logical grounds, for Curl had permitted a limited
inquiry into the defendant's mental state during the guilt phase of trial.
Hebard must therefore be taken as a significant, if unwitting, extension
of the Curl position.
In Sprague, this exclusionary rule was again extended. Sprague's
facts peculiarly silhouette the prejudice that may accrue to a defendant
who chooses to exercise the "Sch6ffner option." Unlike Hebard,
Sprague did not deny the act of which he was accused. Moreover, there
was apparently no doubt that his claim of epileptic seizure would
amount to insanity under any test; the question was whether a seizure
had in fact occurred.' 6 Yet by electing to be judged by the liberal defini-
tion of insanity, Sprague was saddled with the burden of proof on that
issue. It seems more than passing strange that the Wisconsin court has
never considered this "bargain" aspect of the Schoffner procedure or
confronted the problems presented when a defendant elects a bifurcated
trial to his obvious prejudice.
Two explanations are possible. First, the Wisconsin court may
believe that the "trade" its procedure sanctions will always prove benefi-
cial to the defendant. Alternatively, it may feel that the allocation of
the burden of proof is of minimal significance.
To the degree that the former explanation differs from the latter,
it is clearly untenable. First, it is quite common for an insanity defense
to fail for lack of proof of impairment at the time of the offense.
Sprague affords an obvious example. Moreover, many types of insanity
result in just the sort of cognitive disorder that the M'Naghten test
purports to evaluate.' 7 It is clear that a defendant with certain disorders
51d. at 416-17, 184 N.W. 2d at 161.
"The effect of a seizure has been described as "so clearly incapacitating as to make frivolous
any effort to measure the resulting behavior by the! rules of mens rea." A. GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 203 (1967).
1TW. NEUSTATTER, supra note 3, at 19-20, 58-59.
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would be wise to leave the burden of proving sanity on the state and have
his disorder judged by the M'Naghten rule. If the defendant believed
that his victim was a zombie or a devil in human form, for example, he
would err in electing the Schoffner bifurcated procedure.
The second explanation merits more lengthy examination. In other
contexts the United States Supreme Court has held that the state must
prove all elements of a criminal offense "beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 't8
Yet in Leland v. Oregon9 the Court held constitutional an Oregon
statute requiring criminal defendants to establish their insanity beyond
that same reasonable doubt.21 Paradoxically, the Leland opinion leaves
little doubt that mens rea presupposes sanity. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has noted the grave prejudice done defendants by such a
shifting of the burden of proof and has expressed doubts about its
continued constitutional viability.2' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has not recently considered the issue.
Besides Wisconsin, four state courts have recently considered the
constitutionality of resting the burden of proving insanity on the defen-
dant. Unlike Wisconsin, however, these courts have thought the issue
of critical significance.
In State v. Cuevas22 the Hawaii Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute that required the defendant to disprove the existence of
malice aforethought once the state had shown that he had done the act.
"'[T]he burden of proof,' " the court said, "' is never upon the accused
to establish his innocence, or to disprove those facts necessary to estab-
lish the crime for which he is indicated.' "213 The Hawaii court had
previously held that mental defects not amounting to insanity may nega-
tive the ability to formulate specific intent to kill or to harbor malice
aforethought.2 This linking of issues necessarily implies that in the
Hawaii view the existence of mens rea requires sanity and thus makes
it apparent that the Cuevas holding includes shifting the burden on
insanity within its constitutional ban.
Similarly, in People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court,5 the Colorado
Supreme Court struck down a statute shifting the burden of proving
"9E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
19343 U.S. 790 (1952).
"Id. at 794-95.
2Timmons v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966).
.. __Hawaii___, 488 P.2d 322 (1971).
mId. at -, 488 P.2d at 324, quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895).
"State v. Moeller, 50 Hawaii 110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967).
2165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968).
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
insanity to the defendant as being violative of the due process clause of
the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado court observed that the state
must prove all elements of the offense charged. 6 The court looked to
an earlier Colorado case, Becksted v. People,27 which involved the other
half of the "Schoffner option," the question of admissibility at the guilt
portion of trial of evidence relating to mental condition. The court took
a view directly opposite to that held by Wisconsin and said with some
exasperation that "[a] defendant in -a first degree murder case has the
right, without reference to a plea of insanity, to establish mental defi-
ciency as bearing upon his capacity to form the specific intent essential
to first degree murder.""6 The recognition of this same right led the
Arizona Supreme court to declare the Arizona bifurcated trial statute
unconstitutional. In State v. Shaw the Arizona court reasoned that
evidence of mental incapacity must be inadmissible at the guilt portion
of trial-otherwise the insanity portion would be redundant. However,
the court found that criminal intent would not exist without sanity. To
remove consideration of sanity could prevent the finding of culpable
intent, an essential element of the crime. This, it was held, the legislature
is without power to do.
Shaw of course rests entirely on its assumption that repetition of
evidence as to mental condition would be so unthinkable that the legisla-
ture could not possibly have intended it. This assumption is hardly more
reasonable than the analogous Wisconsin belief that it would involve an
intolerable waste of judicial resources. 0 Both ignore the relative infre-
quency of the insanity plea .3
The constitutional problems raised both by the shifting of the bur-
den of proof and by the exclusion of evidence relating to mental condi-
tion seem to have completely escaped the Wisconsin court. Both issues
were considered in Hebard, and both were given short shrift. The
Hebard court first considered the constitutionality of excluding evidence
of mental condition at the guilt phase. In what can only be described as
a bootstrap operation, the court equated due process with fairness or
"Id. at -, 439 P.2d at 748.
2133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956).
"Id. at 82, 292 P.2d at 194 (emphasis by the court).
21106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
"Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 484, 162 N.W.2d 77, 82 (1968).
A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 28 (1970): "[I]n each jurisdic-
tion surveyed, criminal responsibility cases constituted a small percentage of all cases. In Illinois,
Michigan, and Florida only a handful of cases occur each year; there is a somewhat higher
frequency in California and a still higher frequency in the District of Columbia."
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fair play and then went on to hold that fairness would not be served by
depriving a defendant of his right to choose between a single and a
bifurcated trial.-2 Then turning to the constitutionality of shifting the
burden of proof at the insanity phase, the Hebard court largely con-
tented itself with citing Leland. It asserted that the burden of proof on
the essential elements of the crime did not shift 3 and that "as we see
it, a court finding of legal insanity is not a finding of inability to intend;
it is rather a finding that under the applicable standard or test, the
defendant is to be excused from criminal responsibility for his acts."
The court went on to characterize the insanity defense as a plea in
confession and avoidance.35
This view, as applied in Sprague, approaches a position of strict
liability for homicide, at least with respect to degree: neither the exist-
ence of malice nor the formation of a mental purpose to kill may be
rebutted during the guilt portion of trial. Under such a view insanity is
not properly characterized as a defense.
The Wisconsin position as it exists after Hebard and Sprague is
strikingly similar to an earlier California view. In People v. Troche,36
in which the California bifurcated trial statute was upheld, the court
stated that evidence of defendant's mental condition was not admissible
at the guilt portion of trial. The court termed bifurcation a mere proce-
dural matter and implied that insanity did not affect the unlawful qual-
ity of the act but served rather to explain or excuse it. A companion
case, People v. Leong Fook,7 made this last premise explicit, although
in Leong Fook the court seemed to recognize that insanity results in an
inability to formulate criminal intent.3 8 The inconsistency of these
statements does not appear to have been noticed by the California court.
These cases, of course, are no longer authority, having long since
given way in California to the concept of "diminished responsibility."
Under this doctrine, evidence of mental disease or defect not amounting
to legal insanity is admitted at the guilt portion of trial.3 1 Such evidence
3250 Wis. 2d at 421-22, 184 N.W.2d at 163-64.
11Id. at 422-23, 184 N.W.2d at 163-64.
31ld. at 420, 184 N.W.2d at 163.
mId. at 423, 184 N.W.2d at 164.
"206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928).
11206 Cal. 64, 273 P.779 (1928).
31ld. at 71-72, 273 P. at 782.
"People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330,
202 P.2d 53 (1949).
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may negative either the ability to premediate ° or the ability to govern
one's conduct in accordance with the law.4 Consequently there are
possibilities of jury verdicts of second degree murder12 or manslaugh-
ter.43 In the latter case, the mental disorder is regarded as negativing
the ability to act with malice." Under the diminished responsibility
doctrine, evidence of epilepsy would be considered both on the issue of
malice aforethought and on the issue of specific intent.' " In fact, Califor-
nia has recently characterized the condition of epileptic seizure as one
of "totally diminished capacity."46
California's view, as unique as Wisconsin's," has been severely
criticized as defeating the very purpose for which the bifurcated proce-
dure was enacted." Indeed, California's experience with bifurcated trials
was discussed at great length in State v. Shaw49 and may have been a
major factor in the Arizona court's conclusion that the bifurcated proce-
dure was either duplicative or unconstitutional.
Moreover, it can be argued that a resolution of insanity cases in
terms of one's belief as to whether mens rea presupposes sanity involves
a fundamental misconception of issues. The same criticism may be
made of the pendent issues of allocation of the burden of proof of sanity.
Given a disturbed offender, the appropriate inquiry would look to the
degree to which the offender's conduct, in view of his disorder, merits
criminal sanctions. California has at least realized that this question
requires some flexibility in approach. Yet the California procedure has
been criticized as being self-defeating and unreasonably wasteful.
Wisconsin is in a unique position in that it could gain California's
flexibility while retaining its own judicial economy. Its exclusionary rule
operates to postpone the issues of mens rea and sanity until the latter
stage of trial. In effect, its bifurcated trial is a sequential trial on the
issues of actus reus and mens rea. By judicially recognizing this fact, the
'*People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
"People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
"2People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
"People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911,918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
4Id. at 317, 411 P.2d at 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
"sPeople v. Williams, - Cal. App. 3d -, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1971).
"Id. at -, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
"Compare People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), with State v. Hebard, 50
Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W. 2d 156 (1971).
"Comment, The Gradual Decay of the Bifurcated Trial System in California and the Emerg-
ence of"Partial Insanity": 1966, 3 CALIF. W. L. REV. 149 (1967).
106 Ariz. 103, 109-1I, 471 P.2d 715, 721-23 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
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court could undertake a further experiment. At the second phase of
trial, the jury could be instructed on the factors which would lead to a
finding of diminished capacity. Only then would they fix the degree of
offense. Should they find, for example, that the defendant was incapable
of forming the specific intent to kill, the verdict would be second degree
murder. No significant duplication of judicial effort would be involved,
and no repetition of expert testimony would be required.
CHARLES 0. PEED, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Probable Cause and Due Process at Sentencing
The guilt determination process in the American judicial system is
characterized by rigorous procedural and evidentiary standards and ex-
tensive appellate review designed to ferret out the slightest harmful
error. The criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is
assured by specific procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights as well
as by the broader fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of
law. But once guilt is established, all these procedural safeguards seem
to vanish. Although the Supreme Court has said that the sentencing
process is subject to scrutiny under the due process clause,' the extension
of procedural due process safeguards to sentencing has been the excep-
tion rather than the rule.' Furthermore, there is normally no substantive
review of sentences in federal appellate courts,3 and the vast discretion
of the sentencing judge remains largely unfettered. This note will exam-
ine the criminal defendant's rights during sentencing and will discuss a
case that significantly extends presently recognized due process safe-
guards surrounding the sentencing process.
Recently in United States v. Weston4 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the information considered in sentencing a criminal
defendant, vacated the sentence, and remanded, holding that "the Dis-
'See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949).
2See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821,
824-25 (1968).
3See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15
VAND. L. REV. 671 (1962); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE 13-15 (Approved Draft 1968). At
present fifteen states make appellate review of sentences available on a regular basis. Id. at 13.
1448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
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trict Court may not rely upon the information contained in the present-
ence report unless it is amplified by information such as to be persuasive
of the validity of the charges there made."5
Janice Weston was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing,
and facilitating the transportation of illegally imported heroin. The trial
judge initially indicated that the minimum mandatory sentence of five
years would be appropriate, but upon request of the prosecutor the judge
agreed to have a presentence report prepared before imposing sentence.'
The report contained charges that the defendant was one of the largest
distributors of naroctics in the state and that she went to Mexico as
often as once every two weeks to obtain drugs. The trial judge imposed
the maximum sentence of twenty years on the basis of the report and
then, because of the severity of the sentence, examined the information
upon which the report was based. This consisted principally of an un-
sworn memorandum in which a narcotics agent quoted a named inform-
ant who had said that on one occasion the defendant was preparing to
go to Mexico. The trial judge determined that without a reasonable
doubt the presentence report was substantiated by such factual informa-
tion.
The court of appeals, which also examined the confidential memo-
randum, did not object to the consideration in sentencing of criminal
conduct of which the defendant has been neither formally accused nor
convicted;7 however, the court did object to the use of virtually unsup-
ported allegations of such criminal conduct. The court denounced the
use of an unsworn, unverified statement of an informer who had not
been shown to be reliable and the fact that the memorandum did not
corroborate the broad charges made in the report.8
At common law the criminal defendant had two rights at sentenc-
Vd. at 634.
61d. at 627-28. Preparation of the presentence report is controlled by FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(l),
which states:
The probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation and report
to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation unless the
court otherwise directs. The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents
disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty.
7448 F.2d at 633. Contra, Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1968), in which
the court set a rule for the circuit that "[n]o conviction or criminal charge should be included in
the report, or considered by the court, unless referable to an official record." The American Bar
Association has suggested that all arrests and other dispositions short of adjudication should be
excluded from the presentence report. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROBATION 37 (Approved Draft 1970).
1448 F.2d at 630.
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ing-the right to be present when sentence was pronounced,9 and the
right of allocution. 0 Since virtually all crimes were felonies at common
law, and all felonies were punishable by execution and attainder, the
trial judge had only ritual duties at sentencing." Nineteenth century
penal reform brought about a change from the absolute, legislatively
fixed penalty to penalties expressed in statutory minimum and maxi-
mum terms of imprisonment. 12 This concept of individually tailored
sentences, determined by the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, gives the trial judge vast discretion as to both the appro-
priate sentence and the relevant criteria that provide the basis for his
determination. This rehabilitative approach to penology demands that
the sentencing judge be apprised of the background of the defendant.
The modern tool for achieving this result is the presentence report-a
report based on an investigation conducted by probation officers or
social workers.'" Reform movements gave the trial judge greater discre-
'Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) (after indictment nothing can be done in
the absence of the defendant; this right cannot be waived in a felony). In North Carolina the
defendant has the right to be present throughout all stages of the trial. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18,
formerly N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1868), cited in State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330, 126 S.E.2d
126, 129 (1962), noted in 41 N.C.L. REV. 260 (1963). FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 states in part:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition
of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been comm-
enced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return
of the verdict.
Several lower federal courts have cited United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162 (1963) in
holding that imposition of sentence in the absence of the defendant was in violation of procedural
due process. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1965). However,
the decision in Behrens was based only on rule 43, as is made clear by Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion: "Whether or not the Constitution would permit any other procedure it is not
now necessary to decide." 375 U.S. at 168.
"Although technically "allocution is the formal address of the trial court to the prisoner as
the prisoner stands at the bar for sentence .... " the term is generally used today to mean the
implied right to reply. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (1944). For a good discussion
of the common law right of allocution and a survey of state law, see id. (pts. 1-2), at 115, 232.
"Barrett, supra note 10, at 119; Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal:
The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1968).
"Note, 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 822.
"For a discussion of the functions, objectives, and preparation of the presentence report, see
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT (Pub. No. 103, 1965); for a survey of state practices, see ABA PROJECT FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 200-04 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1965) provides for optional presentence investiga-
tions before sentencing. See State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 334-35, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962)
(presentence investigations are encouraged).
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tion, but there was no corresponding growth of procedural or substan-
tive safeguards against judicial error or prejudice.
It was in this milieu of almost total discretion in the trial courts
and no procedural safeguards for the convicted defendant that the Su-
preme Court began to scrutinize the sentencing process for the possibili-
ties of prejudice. In Townsend v. Burke,'4 an unrepresented defendant
had been sentenced on the basis of a misreading of court records because
of the judge's apparent failure to distinguish between prior arrests and
prior convictions. The Supreme Court held that the resulting sentence
was in violation of due process of law, but the Court failed to make it
clear whether the absence of counsel, the materially untrue assumptions,
or their juxtaposition violated due process.'5 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court cited Townsend for the sole holding that due process is
denied a defendant who is sentenced on the basis of materially untrue
assumptions about his prior criminal record." This reading of Townsend
provided the basis for the Weston decision. The Weston court said that
it was extending Townsend only slightly in holding that information
used in sentencing must meet standards of probable accuracy as well as
be probative of charges against the defendant. 7 Although the Weston
court never specifically indicated that its decision was required by the
due process clause, both the general language of the opinion and the
doctrinal support of Townsend indicate that this is a consistent reading
of the case. Other lower federal courts have extended the reasoning of
Townsend, holding that the defendant has a right to be sentenced on the
basis of complete information, and have remanded for preparation of a
presentence report and resentencing.'
8
One year after Townsend, in a decision thought by some writers to
have retarded the movement started by Townsend toward giving the
defendant greater protection at sentencing,' 9 the Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York20 held that the trial judge was not restricted in
the sources and kinds of information he may use in determining sent-
"334 U.S. 736 (1948).
"Id. at 740-41.
"United States v. Tucker, 92 S. Ct. 589, 592 (1972).
"1448 F.2d at 634.
"E.g., Leach v. United States, 353 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917
(1966), noted in 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
"Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEX.
L. REv. 25, 29 (1970).
-337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
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ence.21 The defendant's principal contention was that he had a right to
disclosure of the information and to cross-examine the sources of the
information. The Court did not rule on his disclosure argument, pre-
sumably because the sentencing judge voluntarily disclosed the informa-
tion, but held that due process does not assure the defendant the right
to confront and cross-examine the sources of the information.
2
The Court emphasized the need for efficient collection of informa-
tion for sentencing and explained its decision on two grounds. First,
both English and American judicial history indicated that at common
law the sentencing judges were free to consider any information in
determining sentence. Secondly, the Court feared that to extend the
traditional due process safeguards to sentencing would turn sentencing
into a second trial with the consequence of preventing all courts "from
making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal
justice. '24
The Weston court distinguished Williams because there the defen-
dant had failed to object to consideration of the burglary charges in
determining sentence on the grounds that they were not true. His objec-
tion was that the charges had not been introduced in a trial-type hearing.
Janice Weston, on the other hand, not only denied the accuracy of the
charges but also objected to their consideration without further substan-
tiation. 2
5
In 1967 the Supreme Court held in Mempa v. Rhay5 that every
defendant has a right to counsel at sentencing, a "critical stage" in the
criminal trial. Unfortunately, however, the extension of due process
safeguards at sentencing has been left largely to the lower federal
courts.21 One issue frequently raised is whether the defendant has a right
to see the presentence report.2 At present the Federal Rules of Criminal
2 Accord, State v. Thompson, 267 N.C. 653, 655, 148 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1966).
2337 U.S. at 250-51.
2Id. at 246.
11ld. at 251.
2448 F.2d at 631. The dissenting judge in Weston thought that the majority holding was a
repudiation of the rule of Williams. Id. at 634.
26389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
"Although the Court in Williams refused to extend the traditional due process safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination to sentencing, a footnote indicates that the decision is not to
be read broadly: "What we have said is not to be accepted as a holding that the sentencing
procedure is immune from scrutiny under the due process clause. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736." 337 U.S. at 252 n.18.
"Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal Criminal Courts, 52 IOWA
L. REv. 161, 163-64 (1966).
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Procedure leave disclosure entirely in the discretion of the trial judge.20
Many writers feel that one logical and necessary implication of
Townsend is that unless counsel is allowed to inspect the report, he will
be unable to ensure that the defendant is not sentenced on the basis of
materially untrue assumptions .3  Although commentators contend that
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized a constitutional basis for
the right of disclosure, the Court has not expressly so held.3' Janice
Weston was fortunate to have the opportunity to read the presentence
report, for disclosure is generally denied in the federal courts.32
27The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record
of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition
and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or
in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other
information as may be required by the court. The court before imposing sentence may
disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the re-
port of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant or his
counsel to comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall
also be disclosed to the attorney for the government.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (emphasis added).
10E.g., Guzman, supra note 28, at 174. In support of the argument that right to counsel
requires the right of disclosure, some writers rely partially on the general language of Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962), a case in which a defendant was sentenced without notice under
a recidivist statute: "[I]t would [be] an idle accomplishment to say that due process requires counsel
but not the right to reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." For further discussion, see
Pugh & Carver, supra note 19, at 41.
3 The case most frequently cited to support the argument for indirect recognition of this
constitutional right is Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). There the Supreme Court held
that under the governing statute in the District of Columbia, a juvenile "was entitled to a hearing,
including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports" before the
juvenile court could waive jurisdiction. Id. at 557. The Court further characterized the failure of
the juvenile bourt to provide the petitioner with a hearing as failure to act with "procedural
regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process
and fairness." Id. at 553 (dictum); see Katkin, Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses. Limita-
tions and Civil'Liberties Issues, 55 MINN. L. REv. 15, 26-29 (1970).
In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967), the Supreme Court characterized Williams
as holding "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a judge
to have hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to participate in those hearings
when he came to determine the sentence to be imposed." Although such a broad reading of
Williams seems to weaken significantly any argument for disclosure and the opportunity to rebut,
there are several indications that Williams is no bar to the assertion that due process must require
these safeguards at sentencing. The portion of the Williams opinion referred to in Patterson deals
with the impossibility of gathering information if the judge were restricted to information received
in open court, and therefore it is arguable that the hearings referred to by the Court included the
procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. This narrow reading of Williams
is also supported by the facts of the case and the issues raised by the defendant.
2See Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal
Process, 58 GEO. L.J. 451, 474 (1970). See also United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775, 776 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (abuse of discretion for trial judge to have uniform policy of nondisclosure).
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Another implication to be drawn from this line of cases is that the
defendant has the right to rebut adverse information. Although rule
32(a)(1)33 gives the defendant the opportunity to present personally
any information in mitigation of punishment, the Supreme Court has
held that failure of the trial judge to ask the defendant if he had anything
to say before sentence was imposed was neither a constitutional error
nor "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.'34 However, the Court has pointed out that it has never
decided whether it would be a violation of due process affirmatively to
deny the defendant an opportunity to speak in mitigation of punish-
ment.35 But even this limited right will prove to be of substantial value
to the defendant only when there is disclosure of the information used
in sentencing.
The Anglo-American system of justice traditionally has relied upon
However, the principal arguments against disclosure-that informational sources would dry
up if the report were not kept confidential and that disclosure would unjustifiably extend sentenc-
ing-have now been discredited, and the 1970 proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for mandatory disclosure of the factual information to be used in determining
sentence. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 48 F.R.D. 553, 614-15 (1970). A good summary of arguments for and against disclo-
sure is found in id. at 618 (Advisory Committee Note). Although the judiciary has not provided
the principal impetus for the proposed change, there has been some judicial recognition of the
advisability of a change in procedure. United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
mFED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) states:
Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence the court
may commit the defendant or continue or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the
court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall
address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.
In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961), the Supreme Court noted that this rule had
evolved from the common law right of allocution.
"Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). However, at common law such an omission
was grounds for reversal of the penalty of attainder. Barrett, supra note 10, at 121.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 219 (1971). Mr. Justice Douglas, however, feels that
it is already settled that allocution is a "constitutional right-the right to speak to the issues
touching on sentencing before one's fate is sealed." Id. at 238 (dissenting opinion); accord, State
v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
In McGautha, the Supreme Court held that allowing capital juries absolute discretion, uncon-
trolled by any standards, does not violate due process of law. However, because juries decide
sentences only on evidence which has been introduced in open court, subject to control by proce-
dural rules and traditional due process safeguards, the situation does not present the same problems
as sentencing by a trial judge, who is not restrained in what information he may consider in his
determination of sentence. For a discussion of McGautha, see Note, Criminal Procedure-Capital
Sentencing by a Standardless Jury, 50 N.C.L. REv. 118 (1971).
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the adversary system to bring out the facts; the impartiality of a judge
has not been considered sufficient to ensure adequate investigation.'
But as the sentencing stage of the criminal trial evolved, the impartiality
of the sentencing judge became the only safeguard for the defendant.
The convicted defendant might have a constitutional right to be present
and to make a statement before sentence is pronounced, and he defi-
nitely has the right to be represented by counsel at sentencing and to be
sentenced on the basis of accurate information. However, without the
appropriate procedural safeguards, these rights are nothing more than
hollow promises of justice. Can the impartiality of the judge assure the
defendant the right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate infor-
mation? The usual answer to this question has been that disclosure and
the right to rebut any adverse charges would provide the defendant with
the necessary safeguards.3 1 In Weston, the defendant denied the allega-
tions, but the trial judge ruled that unless she could refute the charges
with factual information, he had no alternative but to accept them as
true.38 The appellate court recognized that the procedure in the trial
court allowed narcotics agents to accuse a convicted defendant of a
second and more serious crime, presenting as evidence only the "unveri-
fied statements of a faceless informer," knowing that the defendant
would have the burden of disproving the charge.39 The court asserted
that to burden the defendant with this difficult task of "proving a nega-
tive" would be a "great miscarriage of justice."4
The Weston court's primary concern seemed to be that the judicial
system has a duty to ensure that every defendant is treated according
to the broad requirement of fundamental fairness. The court asserted
that "[a] rational penal system must have some concern for the probable
accuracy of the informational imputs in the sentencing process."'" In
effect, the Weston court held that the trial judge had abused his discre-
tion by basing the sentence on information of little probative value.4"
"The one notable exception to this has been by necessity in the issuance of search warrants
by a magistrate.
3See Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1291
(1952).
"The trial judge also informed defendant's counsel that pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, if within 120 days after imposition of sentence facts were submitted





12Although the court never actually said that the trial judge had abused his discretion, this is
the only logical implication of the holding.
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The holding in Weston seems to be grounded in the proposition that this
abuse of discretion resulted in a denial of due process.43 Some support
for this proposition is found in Williams, in which the Court recognized
that "[leaving a sentencing judge free to avail himself of out-of-court
information in making such a fateful choice of sentence does secure to
him a broad discretionary power, one susceptible of abuse,"" and im-
plied that such an abuse would be a violation of due process.45 Although
appellate courts readily recognize that a trial judge can abuse his discre-
tion in sentencing, 6 only rarely is this indicated by anything other than
dicta. In Weston the court recognized that the safeguard of voluntary
disclosure is largely illusory and attempted to set up a standard to
ensure that sentences are based on accurate information that is proba-
tive of some assertion relevant to sentencing.
The requirement established by the Weston court to ensure that this
discretion is not abused is that information used to support a present-
ence recommendation must "be persuasive of the validity of the charges
there made. 4 8 This rather vague standard becomes clearer when read
in conjunction with the court's pointed comparison of the information
in the confidential report with a valid search or arrest warrant.49 Appar-
ently the Weston court has suggested that the trial judge should apply
a probable cause test to the presentence report. Certain similarities
between an affidavit for issuance of a warrant and a presentence report
easily lead to such an analysis. Both frequently are based on information
from informers or on other unsworn statements. Both can be based on
evidence not legally competent in a criminal trial.5 Hearsay can be the
11448 F.2d at 632. The court's citation of Townsend as precedent for its decision and the
general language used indicating the unfairness of the procedure followed in the trial court leads
to the conclusion that Weston is based on the due process clause.
"337 U.S. at 251.
1Id. at 251-52.
"See. e.g., Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957
(1966) (dictum).
"7But see United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) (imposition of uniform
sentences for all violators of draft orders is abuse of discretion).
"448 F.2d at 634.
UId. at 631. The court said:
[The conviction] is followed by a determination, based on unsworn evidence detailing
otherwise unverified statements of a faceless informer that would not even support a
search warrant or an arrest, and without any of the constitutional safeguards, that
Weston is probably guilty of additional and far more serious crimes, for which she is
then given an additional sentence of fifteen years.
Id.
'Compare Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), with Williams v. New York,
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
basis for the issuance of a warrant just as it can be the basis for a trial
judge's determination of sentence."' And just as reviewing courts have
been directed to pay deference to the determination of probable cause
by a magistrate, appellate courts overrule the discretion of the trial
judge in sentencing only when there has been a gross abuse of discre-
tion.52 Both are used in stages of the judicial process in which a trial-
type hearing complete with standard rules of evidence and all the tradi-
tional due process safeguards would be either impossible or highly im-
practical." Perhaps the most important similarity is the imperative
need for standards to govern both the issuance of warrants and the use
of presentence reports at sentencing. The fourth amendment has sup-
plied the basic standard of probable cause to guard against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the Supreme Court has interpreted what this
standard requires in situations such as in the use of hearsay. 4 The
Weston decision suggests that the same standard should be used at
sentencing.
The problem with setting this type of standard is that enforcement
falls on the overburdened appellate courts. Although appellate courts
traditionally have not reviewed the probative value of information used
in sentencing, the appellate court does have a corresponding role in the
guilt determination stage of the criminal trial. 5 The Supreme Court in
In re Winship5 held that the due process clause requires that an accused
be criminally convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. Although the stan-
dard of proof necessary to allow use of information in sentencing is not
as high, the principle is the same.
Federal appellate courts have no authority to undertake substantive
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). But there are limits to what can be considered, It would be a denial of
due process for the trial judge to determine sentence on the basis of an alleged confession the
constitutional admissibility of which has not been established. United States ex rel Brown v.
Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969).
5'Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960), with Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
52Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960), with United States v. Daniels,
446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
OSee Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
4An affidavit must meet certain requirements before a warrant will be issued on the basis of
information from an informer. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969).
"Some support for review of the probative value of information used in sentencing is found
in Arciniega v. Freeman, 92 S. Ct. 22 (1971) (per curiam), in which the Court decided that
petitioner's parole status had been revoked without "satisfactory evidence."
56397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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review of sentences so long as the sentence falls within the statutory
limits.57 The majority of the Weston court said that its review was
justified because "[t]here is a difference between reviewing a sentence
and deciding that certain types of information should not, for various
reasons, be considered in sentencing."5 In support of the procedure
chosen-vacating the sentence and remanding with instructions to disre-
gard the objectionable information-the court cited several cases as
precedents.
In Verdugo v. United States,59 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that when evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights is
used in sentencing, the case would be remanded for resentencing without
considering the evidence so obtained. Tucker v. United States,'" another
Ninth Circuit case and one that was subsequently affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, held that in determining sentence the trial judge could not
consider prior uncounseled convictions invalid under Gideon v.
Wainwright.' These cases set rules that a trial judge can easily follow
without the necessity of extensive appellate court involvement. How-
ever, the Weston decision virtually demands appellate review of every
case in which a presentence report is used. In Weston the trial judge
examined the supporting information apparently in a manner similar to
that which would be required under the probable cause standards, but
the appellate court differed in its estimation of the probative value of
the information. The dissenting judge may be correct in his assertion
that the majority is making an end run around the cases barring review
of sentences and thus opening up Pandora's box on procedure at sent-
encing. 2 But the real question is not whether such a procedure goes
against precedent or will be burdensome; rather, it is whether fundamen-
tal fairness requires such a result.
57Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (dictum); accord, Gurera v. United States,
40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). But see United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960),
which some commentators feel may signal a penological revolution in the federal appellate courts.
Wiley is discussed in Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 683-84 (1962). Presumably, however, this rule would not prevent
review of a sentence on the grounds of a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
"1448 F.2d at 631.
51402 F.2d 599, 610-13 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971). Contra, United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
90431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 92 S. Ct. 589 (1972).
61372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6448 F.2d at 634 (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps the Bill of Rights does not provide safeguards at sentenc-
ing, but in the late eighteenth century, no safeguards were needed. At
that time, sentences were fixed for the crime, not individualized by the
sentencing judge to fit the defendant. Today the convicted defendant
needs protection from mistakes and arbitrary and capricious action
during sentencing just as much as the accused during trial. In a sector
of the judicial process in which the stakes for society and the defendant
are so high as they are at sentencing, and in which procedural safeguards
are inadequate, there is a strong case for developing a body of substan-
tive standards to ensure that sentences are not based on inaccurate
assumptions of little probative value. Disclosure of the presentence re-
port and opportunity to rebut adverse charges is certainly a safeguard
that should be guaranteed to the criminal defendant. However, as
Weston has shown, that alone is not sufficient. Perhaps the best solution
would be to provide for an appellate system to review sentences of all
defendants. Short of such a radical change, however, the solution of the
Weston court may provide a viable alternative.
MARVIN ALLEN BETHUNE
Professional Responsibility- Covenants Not To Compete Between At-
torneys
A, a lawyer, wishes to hire X, another lawyer, to workfor him in a
small town in western North Carolina. Because the town is small, A
would like somehow to ensure that X will not later leave his employment
and set up a competing practice in the same community. A most likely
will ask X to agree in writing not to practice law in the town for one
year after the termination of employment. X, understanding A's
position and intending to leave the town after a few years anyway,
agrees. Whether or not this is a common situation in this state or around
the country, it appears that this would be a reasonable approach to the
problem provided the lawyers have a full understanding of their con-
tract. However, according to the Council of the North Carolina State
Bar, A, and probably X, is guilty of unethical conduct.
On October 21, 1971, the Council responded to two inquries related
to the problem of A and X:
(1) Is it unethical for an attorney employing another attorney to
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include as a part of the agreement between them a restrictive covenant
prohibiting the employee from practicing law in a specified local area
for a specified time after the termination of the employment?
(2) May a restrictive covenant upon the individual practice of
law by a withdrawing partner be incorporated into a partnership agree-
ment?'
The Council answered the first inquiry affirmatively and the second
negatively. The Council's opinions were in part based on ABA Formal
Opinion 300,2 which reasoned that since Canon 27 prohibits solicitation,
an employee-lawyer could not actively seek out the business of those
clients of his past employer (or partner) with whom he had contact.
Furthermore, the ABA Committee felt that Canons 6 and 37 bind the
lawyer to preserve the secrets and confidences of clients of his former
employer and that Canon 7 prohibits interference with the work of
another attorney.' Since a restrictive covenant is not necessary to en-
force the provisions of the Canons of Ethics and since the Canons
safeguard any protectible interest, a restrictive covenant would be im-
proper.
The North Carolina Council also relied on the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A),' which provides
that "a lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits."
Finally, the Council acknowledged the policy argument that an attorney
is licensed by the state and, regardless of his location, should be free to
provide assistance to all potential clients who desire to engage him-or,
stated conversely, the legal profession considers the right of a client to
choose his own counsel to be of paramount importance.6
At common law, the covenant not to compete was considered a
'N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 776 (1971), reported, 18 THE NORTH CAROLINA
BAR no. 4 at 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as N.C. BAR].
'ABA CoMiM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 300 (1961).
3Canons 6, 7, 27, and 37 refer to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which were replaced
by the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970. North Carolina is not among the majority of
states that have adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility.
'All the disciplinary rules are mandatory in nature and state the minimum standard of con-
duct. Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
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"restraint of trade" and was, therefore, not upheld.7 The strict view
against these covenants was gradually eroded8 and the courts began to
uphold them when the equities of the case required it.' Though some
state statutes declare restrictive covenants of this type void, many states
uphold them.' 0 The general tests applied by the courts to determine their
validity are necessity and reasonableness, and a covenant normally will
be upheld if it is not excessive." To determine if the restriction is exces-
sive, the courts look at the scope 2 and duration of the restriction.' 3
These factors are balanced against the employer's protectible interests,
the hardship imposed on the employee, and the interests of the public.'
Courts have even gone so far as to uphold a restrictive covenant that
was excessive in scope if it was possible to salvage some acceptable
restraint out of the covenant. 5 The "blue-pencil" test " and the doctrine
of selective construction' 7 are the two most common methods used by
the courts to enforce some portion of an excessive covenant. 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has stated that restrictive covenants will be
upheld if they are in writing, for valuable and contemporaneous consid-
7Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414), cited in Comment, Contracts in
Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 21 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 214 (1967).
'Apparently the first case to uphold a restrictive covenant was Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wins.
181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). A complete discussion of the developments after Mitchel can
be found in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Blake].
'A distinction should be drawn between restraints incident to the sale of a business, discussion
of which is beyond the scope of this note, and post-employment restraints aimed at prevention of
competitive use of information or relationships peculiar to the employer. See Blake 647.
'"E.g., Louisiana declares such contracts void as against public policy except where the em-
ployer incurs expenses in the specialized training of the employee. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921
(1964). North Dakota and Oklahoma declare all such contracts void except those between partners
in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership and those ancillary to the sale of the good will
of a business. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1966).
The North Carolina General Statutes are silent on the subject.
"RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 513-15 (1932) provide a basis for the tests used. See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955).
'2E.g., Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); see Blake 675-77.
'3E.g., Asheville Associates, Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 121 S.E.2d 593 (1961); see Note,
Covenants Not to Compete, 38 N.C.L. Rev. 395 (1960).
"Comment, 21 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J., supra note 7, at 215; s-e Blake 651-87.
15E.g., Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
"So named because the covenant will be upheld if the excessive restraint can be eliminated
by merely marking out the objectionable portions. Id. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 747 (dissenting
opinion).
"Creter v. Creter, 52 N.J. Super. 197, 145 A.2d 149 (1958).
"For a thorough discussion of these tests see Note, Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. REV. 691 (1972).
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eration, reasonable as to time and territory embraced, fair to the parties,
and not against public policy. 9 Since the Council made no reference to
the scope of reasonableness of the restrictive covenant it was consider-
ing, it must have been concerned with the public policy involved.
Other state ethics committees that have considered the problem of
restrictive covenants in lawyers' employment and partnership agree-
ments have taken varied approaches. At least one committee has gone
to the opposite extreme from the North Carolina and American Bar
Association committees and has held that a covenant not to practice law
is ethical if entered into between lawyers with no substantial inequality
of bargaining power. Furthermore, this committee held that violation
of the covenant is unethical." However, many bar committees agree
with the North Carolina opinion.2'
Perhaps the best statement of the underlying policy reasons for the
North Carolina opinion is articulated in the American Bar Association
Formal Opinion 300, from which the Council quoted extensively. In
1945, the ABA Committee had stated that it was improper for an
attorney to purchase the practice and good will of an attorney who was
not his partner because the good will of an attorney is not an asset to
be bought and sold. This led the Committee to conclude that if the
conduct in question can be considered an effort by attorneys to "barter
in clients" it is unprofessional.22 The view of the ABA Committee was
further substantiated by the language of Canon 7, which says that
"[e]fforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the profes-
sional employment of another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should
be brethren at the Bar . . . ."2 In Formal Opinion 300, the ABA
Committee relied on this 1945 opinion and the Canons24 dealing with
the prohibition against solicitation and the preservation of the secrets
and confidences of clients. The Committee reasoned that since these
canons can be enforced without reliance on restrictive covenants and
since the Canons of Ethics adequately protect any protectable interest,
"Asheville Associates, Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 121 S.E.2d 593 (1961).
"Opinion 148 (!11. 1958), reported. DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION OPINIONS II (Maru ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST].
21Opinion 127 (Ore. 1963), reported, DIGEST 435; Opinion 3 (Allegheny County, N.Y. 1962),
reported. DIGEST 445; Opinion 831 (N.Y. City, N.Y. 1957), reported, DIGEST 334; Opinion 688
(N.Y. City, N.Y. 1945), reported, DIGEST 318.
2"ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 266 (1945).
2"ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7.
21ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 6, 27 & 37.
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a restrictive covenant would be improper and inconsistent with the pro-
fessional status of attorneys.
One problem with the reasoning of the ABA Committee and the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar is that it fails to take into
consideration the increased tolerance that the courts have displayed for
this type of restrictive covenant. 5 Courts have been required to consider
the public policy when faced with restrictive covenants in other types of
employment contracts. They have upheld the restrictions even 6 though
the practice involved could easily have been considered a "profession
and a privilege granted by the state. '27 It is at least conceivable that the
Council may find itself in the position of attempting to discipline an
attorney for entering into a restrictive covenant that the courts have
already enforced. 28
Enforcement of the Council's opinion presents still another prob-
lem. The statute empowering the North Carolina Council to administer
punishment lists the grounds upon which the Council may proceed
against an attorney. Only two of those grounds might possibly be inter-
preted as empowering the Council to discipline attorneys for entering
into restrictive covenant contracts: that dealing with violations of can-
ons of ethics and that allowing punishment for "conduct involving will-
ful deceit, fraud or any other unprofessional conduct."2 Since the Coun-
cil did not state that the use of a restrictive covenant violates a specific
canon of ethics, the only possible section of the statute upon which the
Council can rely is that allowing punishment for "unprofessional
conduct." Therefore, enforcement of the Council's opinion will put it
in the anomalous position of finding that it is unprofessional for an
attorney to include in an employment contract he drafts for his own
',See text accompanying notes 8-19 supra.
2 'See, e.g., Toulmin v. Becker, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 109, 124 N.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1954) (patent
attorney); Scadron's Sons v. Susskind, 132 Misc. 406, 229 N.Y.S. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (optometr-
ist); Dodd, Contracts Not to Practice Medicine, 23 B.U.L. Rav. 305 (1943) (doctors). See also
cases cited in Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955).
27N.C. BAR 13.
"ln Hicklin v. O'Brien, I 1 111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956), the court, while upholding
a restrictive covenant between doctors, stated that "[ilt is not necessary for us to determine whether
the contract violates some canon of professional ethics." Id. at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28 (1965) states that an appointed council "(2) May administer the
punishments . . . for any of the following causes: . . . d. Conduct involving willful deceit or fraud
or any other unprofessional conduct . . . f. The viblation of any of the canons of ethics which have




professional employees the same covenant that he can, and in some
instances must, include in the employment contracts he drafts for clients
from all other professions, businesses, and trades. Yet, as a British court
said, "[t]he case of a solicitor is eminently a case where some protection
is almost always necessary if the employee is a person who is being
employed in a more or less confidential position, where he does come
into touch with, and does get to know, some, at any rate, of his em-
ployer's clients.""0
Thus the Council declined to express reasons of its own for holding
the covenant not to compete unethical and instead relied principally
upon ABA Opinion 300,31 which in turn had relied very heavily upon
the prohibition against attempts to "barter in clients". Although this is
a catching phrase, examination of its source leads to the conclusion that
it should not be used in the context of covenants not to compete. The
phrase "bartering in clients" was originally used in an ABA opinion
which found it unethical for an attorney to purchase the business and
good will of another attorney." Purchase of the good will of a lawyer
would indeed be bartering in clients. There would always be some hag-
gling over how much a lawyer should pay to get a particular client, and
once the sale is made the clients presumably would be required to go to
the purchasing attorney. However, there is a difference between at-
tempting to buy the good will and business of a lawyer and merely
inserting a non-competition covenant in an employment contract. In the
former the clients are, at least theoretically, forced to go to the purchas-
ing attorney or firm, and the clients are the subject matter of the trans-
action; but in the latter, the agreement does not purport to control the
clients, who are in precisely the same status before and after the employ-
ment contract is entered into. A possible exception is the situation in
which the size of the town is such that only a few lawyers are practicing
there. A demand by an employer for a covenant not to compete may
further reduce the clients' choice by discouraging lawyers who do not
wish to be so bound from seeking employment in the community. Of
course, this is not related to bartering in clients, and an employer in a
small town may, because of limited clientele, have precisely the type of
"Dickson v. Jones, [1939] 3 All E.R. 182, 188 (Ch.).
"ABA Informal Opinion Number 1072, upon which the Council also relies, merely restates
the position of opinion 300, as does Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Therefore, these enunciations are as questionable bases for the Council's decision
as was the original opinion.
"1ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 266 (1945).
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protectible interests anticipated by the courts.
Somewhere between the purchase of the good will of an attorney
and the hiring of a new associate is the partnership agreement between
practicing attorneys. A lawyer from the same community entering into
a partnership agreement will be bringing his established clients with
him. If, as a condition to the agreement, he is required to forego the
practice of law in the community upon the dissolution of the partnership
it can be argued that he is trading his clients for the right to be a partner.
However, the clients are free to choose any attorney they may wish
during the course of the partnership, and upon termination of the part-
nership the clients may still go to the established firm upon which they
were relying or they may go elsewhere. The converse of the underlying
policy that clients should be free to choose their own attorneys is the
right of an attorney to refuse any case. 33 Certainly this right is no less
viable when it happens to be exercised in the course of entering into a
partnership agreement.
It is suggested that the Council's opinion disregards the reality of
the situation. The employing lawyer has a definite interest in protecting
himself, especially when one considers the inherently confidential rela-
tionships formed in the practice of law.34 The courts are likely to en-
force a reasonable covenant not to compete without regard to the opin-
ion of an ethics committee.3 5 In addition, the Council itself may have
difficulty in enforcing its decision because of the vagueness of the statute
involved.36 Finally, it is submitted that the legal profession should be
free to do for itself at least as much as it may be professionally required
to do for its clientele.
TIMOTHY J. SIMMONS
33ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 31. But cf. Ethical Consideration 2-26, ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
31A discussion of the type of employment relationshili that requires protection for the em-
ployee is in Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1456, 1468 (1920), which was cited with approval in Welcome Wagon
Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 249, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961).
15E.g., Hicklin v. O'Brien, I 1 111. App.2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956).
"See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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Securities Regulation-Deception and the "in connection with" Clause
of Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule lOb-
52 are designed to prevent fraud and deceit "in connection with the
purchase and sale of any security."' 3 In Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' the Supreme Court reiterated a liberal
construction of rule lOb-5 and issued rare policy guidance' as to who
must be deceived, what transactions are "in connection with" a sale of
securities, and who has standing to bring a rule l0b-5 cause of action.
The New York State Superintendent of Insurance, as liquidator of
Manhattan Casualty Co. (Manhattan), brought an action for damages
to Manhattan alleged to have resulted from a fraudulent scheme "in
connection with" a sale of United States Treasury bonds owned by it.
Bankers Life, the sole stockholder of Manhattan, sold all its stock to
James F. Begole for five million dollars. A conspiracy of Begole and
Standish T. Bourne, and possibly others, arranged for a check for five
million dollars to be issued by the Irving Trust Company for the pur-
chase price. Because the conspirators had no funds on deposit with
Irving Trust, as soon as the sale of the Manhattan stock was consu-
mated Manhattan's entire investment portfolio consisting of Treasury
bonds was transferred to Irving Trust to cover the five-million-dollar
check.' In order to disguise the fraud, the conspirators initiated a second
series of transactions that resulted in superficially valid corporate books
but an actual loss to Manhattan of five million dollars. The net effect
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The relevant portion
of § 10(b) is set out in Note, Securities Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule
lOb-5, 50 N.C.L. REv. 706, 707 n. I (1972).
217 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). For the text of rule lOb-5 see Note, 50 N.C.L. REv., supra
note 1, at 707 n. 2.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(1971).
192 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
sDespite the fact that § 10(b) and rule l0b-5 "may well be the most frequently litigated
provisions in the federal securities laws," SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969),
Bankers Life is only the second United States Supreme Court interpretation of them. The first
was SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
192 S. Ct. at 167.
7Certificates of deposit were obtained in Manhattan's name in the second series of transac-
tions. However, "the certificates of deposit were never assets of Manhattan" because they had been
pledged upon creation as collateral for a $5,000,000 loan in favor of an unrelated corporation.
People v. Sweeny, 27 N.Y.2d 138, 148, 261 N.E.2d 655, 659-60, 313 N.Y.S.2d 744, 750-51 (1970)
(a criminal trial resulting from these transactions). As a result Manhattan's corporate books
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of these transactions was that Begole and his fellow conspirators ob-
tained control of Manhattan by misappropriating Manhattan's own
assets to buy all of its outstanding stock.8
It was understood that a general state tort law cause of action
existed against the conspirators for the fraudulent transactions which
resulted in the depletion of Manhattan's assets without a corresponding
benefit. However, the issue litigated in Bankers Life was whether a
federal cause of action existed under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.9 The
district court, in dismissing the complaint in Bankers Life, concluded
that "the purity of the security transaction and the purity of the trading
process are the sole objectives"' 0 of lOb-5 jurisdiction. The court of
appeals, affirming, enunciated the congressional purpose as "limited to
preserving the integrity of the securities markets."" However, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that these interpreta-
tions of lOb-5 were too narrow and that "[s]ection 10(b) must be read
flexibly, not technically and restrictively."'" All three courts based their
decisions to some extent on the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and yet they reached obviously different results-possibly be-
cause there is a dearth of evidence as to the congressional intent in
enacting section 10(b).1
3
The Supreme Court in Bankers Life did not directly address the
unsettled issue of whether the plaintiff in a lOb-5 cause of action must
reflected only the sale of its Treasury bonds and the purchase of a certificate of deposit for a like
amount. They did not reflect the misappropriation. 92 S. Ct. at 167.
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970). A federal
cause of action is generally sought by the plaintiff because state substantive law may be more
restrictive and state procedural rules may create obstacles to the plaintiff's recovery. See generally
Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59
YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-36 (1950).
"0300 F. Supp. at 1101.
"1430 F.2d at 361.
292 S. Ct. at 169. This is a reaffirmance of the Court's holding in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), that securities legislation "'enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds,' [should be construed] not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes." (Footnote omitted.) Since Congress could not catalog all the
kinds of fraudulent and illegitimate schemes, it gave broad discretionary powers to the Securities
Commission. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934). See also Rekant v. Desser,
425 F.2d 872, 880 n.15 (5th Cir. 1970).
'32A BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 2.2(331) (Supp. 1970-71).
The purpose of § 10(b) is to serve as a "catch-all" provision and assure fair dealings in securities
transactions. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
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be a purchaser or seller of securities. The purchaser-or-seller require-
ment was initially expressed in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 4 but
subsequent decisions have left its validity uncertain. 5 Instead of settling
this controversy, the Supreme Court chose to base its reversal on the
only transaction in which Manhattan was clearly a seller of securities."6
However, an analysis of the facts indicates at least a practical expansion
of the concept of purchasers or sellers. The Superintendent of Insurance,
the liquidator of Manhattan, 7 was allowed to maintain the action. Be-
cause Manhattan was bankrupt the Superintendent was not protecting
the interests of Manhattan but was actually representing the interests
of Manhattan's creditors and policyholders.
Creditors and policyholders are not members of the corporate
decision-making process and have no proprietary interest in the corpo-
ration's assets. 8 However, the Bankers Life Court gave creditors the
power to represent the corporation in a 1Ob-5 action because the legisla-
tive history of section 10(b) indicates congressional concern for the
impact fraudulent transactions have on creditors and because the offi-
cers, directors, and controlling shareholders are under a fiduciary obli-
gation to protect creditors as well as stockholders. 9
The unusual facts of Bankers Life created further problems that the
1193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
"5At least one court has concluded that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in A.T. Brod &
Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), "seriously challenged, if not overruled" the Birnbaum
doctrine. Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The district court in the
principal case, however, applied the doctrine based on the Second Circuit's post-Brod reaffirmance
of the doctrine in Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Birnbaum doctrine has precipitated
commentaries both pro and con. Compare Patton, The "Purchase or Sale" Restriction of SEC
Rule lOb-5-Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 463 (1969), with
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV.
268 (1968).
"The Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of the SEC as amicus curiae that Bankers Life
could maintain a lOb-5 cause of action based on the sale of the Treasury bonds and that a decision
based on that transaction would afford all the necessary relief. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at
7 n.6. The SEC's reluctance to press its pronounced disagreement with the Birnbaum doctrine is
attributable to its belief that even if the purchaser-or-seller limitation were rejected in Bankers Life,
the other two transactions might have precluded the plaintiff's recovery. Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae for Certiorari at 5.
"T he New York Superintendent of Insurance is vested with all the rights of action that the
insurer possessed. N.Y. INs. LAW § 514(2) (McKinney 1966).
11300 F. Supp. at 1101 n.16.
192 S. Ct. at 169.
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Court dismissed with little discussion. Whether deceit"0 was practiced
upon Manhattan was decided by the Court in four words, "the
seller[corporation] was duped .... "121 However, the question of
whether a corporation can be "duped" when all the persons involved in
its decision-making process are involved in the fraudulent scheme had
given the district court considerably more difficulty.22
The Supreme Court justified its conclusion that Manhattan, as a
seller of securities, was deceived by quoting from a Fifth Circuit case
to the effect that when a person dealing with a corporation denies its
directors access to material information, a lOb-5 action is recognized
because the board is disabled from making an informed judgment.23
The Supreme Court's decision that Manhattan's directors had been
denied access to material information was based on the court of appeals'
finding that the board had been deceived. 24 However, the Supreme
Court's conclusion contradicts the district court's factual determination
that the injury was not incurred by anyone who was the subject of
federal concern because it was not practiced on the officers, directors,
or shareholders of the corporation. 5
When deception is committed by the directors2 or the sharehold-
ers,27 "the corporation is . . . 'deceived,' in the only sense in which a
fictional legal person can be deceived, i.e., through deception practiced
upon those real persons through whom it acts." 8 Moreover, courts have
"Previous Second Circuit decisions have held deception an essential element of a lob-5 cause
of action. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
2192 S. Ct. at 167.
2"[I]t is dubious whether plaintiff corporation was ever defrauded or deceived." 300 F. Supp.
at 1101 n.16.
2Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970).
21"No doubt the deception was successful, for had the board known that [those in control of
Manhattan] intended to misappropriate the proceeds for their own use it undoubtedly would not
have authorized their sale." 430 F.2d at 360.
21300 F. Supp. at 1101 n.16.
28Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). The allegation in Ruckle was that a
majority of the board fraudulently obtained the board's approval of an issue of securities by
withholding a financial statement.
2Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"Id. at 529 (footnote omitted). "All information reasonably relevant to a rational investment
must be disclosed to the decision-making body, whether that body be composed of directors,
officers, or shareholders of the corporation." Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp.
297, 299 (D. Conn. 1966). The issue of deception has met with diverse interpretations. See, e.g.,
O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff d, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (allega-
tions of deception required); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967) (failure
to disclose material facts to disinterested minority directors constitutes deception); Weitzen v.
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allowed lOb-5 actions for failure to disclose information to a minority
of the directors even though the knowing directors have sufficient votes
to perpetrate the scheme, presumably because the "corporation" was
deceived .2 However, the vitality of the deception requirement is suspect
if courts recognize deception of the corporation by treating the "corpo-
ration" separately from its directors and shareholders.",
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took a more practical ap-
proach to this conceptual problem in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook .
3
There the panel acknowledged the general rule that a corporation can
be deceived only if its agents are deceived, since a corporation can act
only through its agents and can know only what its agents know.3 2 The
Schoenbaum panel recognized that a corporation may be defrauded
even if all the directors know the material facts, if the transmission of
information to the corporation is .prevented by a conflict between the
interests of the directors and those of the corporation.3 In other
words, the Schoenbaum panel utilized fictional attributes of a corpora-
tion in order to analyze a specific transaction, but Judge Hays, who later
authored the en banc reversal of the panel decision, dissented and was
quick to point out that the corporate fictionalization could "constitute
a trap for the unwary when they ascribe reality to the fictions. ' 34 The
treatment of a corporation as possessing the attributes of a person
cannot be used as a universal solvent for corporate problems. The an-
Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (failure to disclose material facts to all stockholders
constitutes deception); Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., supra (no deception unless major-
ity of the decision-making body is misled).
2'Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). Nondisclosure is said to injure the
corporation for several reasons: (1) failure to disclose may preclude others from seeking derivative
relief, Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 776 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum); (2) nondisclo-
sure may encourage mismanagement that the knowing director would not otherwise have had the
courage to commit, Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378.(S.D.N.Y. 1967); (3) nondisclosure
may permit the defendants to put themselves in positions to commit further mismanagement, Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
NOne writer, criticizing the finding of deception by treating shareholders as standing in the
place of the corporation, characterized it as "legal slight-of-hand." Comment, Rule lOb-5 Corpo-
rate Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Whom?, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 477, 492 (1968).
3'405 F.2d 200, rev'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
32
1d. at 211. See also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1970); 3 W. FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 790 (perm. ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 9(3),
282(l) (1958).
-405 F.2d at 211.
"Id. at 215 (Hays, J., dissenting). Judge Hays warned against the conclusion that the direc-
tors are the corporation and that therefore the corporation has knowledge if the directors have
knowledge. Id.
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thropomorphism must yield to the predominant concern of effectuating
the remedial purposes of lOb-5, 15 and the corporate fiction should not
be interposed between the directors and the injured shareholders. It
must be "the shareholders, the real owners of the property""0 whom the
directors deceive before there is "deceit" in the lOb-5 sense. Unless the
creditors and policyholders of Manhattan are considered to be "the real
owners" of the corporation, the analysis of deceit in Schoenbaum is not
applicable to the Bankers Life situation. This is true because in Bankers
Life all directors and shareholders were aware of the facts.37 "When it
is practical as well as just to do so, courts have experienced no difficulty
in rejecting such cliches as the directors constitute the corporation and
a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud itself."3 The
Bankers Life Court extended this analysis one step further by allowing
a 1Ob-5 action to be brought to protect creditors from fraud perpetrated
by all the officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation. Just
as the Schoenbaum Court solved the corporate fiction problem by sub-
stituting shareholders for the corporation in order to protect the share-
holders, the Bankers Life Court substituted creditors for the corporation
to allow a lOb-5 action for the protection of creditors.
Bankers Life indicated that Congress in enacting the 1934 Act was
concerned with the protection of corporate creditors. The controlling
stockholder owes his corporation a fiduciary obligation to protect
creditors as well as stockholders, and consequently all transactions be-
tween the stockholders and the corporation that may injuriously affect
the rights of creditors will be carefully examined. 9 Presumably, this
creditor-protection cause of action will be available in the future only
in fact situations in which the interests of the defrauders are adverse to
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
34405 F.2d at 215 (Hays, J., dissenting).
71n Field v. Lew, 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), affd. 296 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), the court held that a corporation could not be injured as a seller when
the sole shareholder authorized a fraudulent misapproproation by corporate insiders. The unau-
thorized acts of the conspirators become the authorized acts of the corporation upon shareholder
ratification. The Bankers Life court rejected this reasoning in order to protect creditors of the
corporation.
'Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964). One court phrased the issue as
whether "the corporation's choice of action . . . [was] made as a reasonable man would make it
if possessed of all the material information .... " Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir.
1970). The imputed knowledge rationale is not followed, presumably because its logical conclusion
would mean the corporation could never be deceived by its directors since their knowledge would
automatically be imputed to the corporation.
1192 S. Ct. at 169.
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the corporation, a requirement which would limit the extent of such
actions.40
In Bankers Life the Supreme Court broadened the scope of trans-
actions that are considered to be "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." The defendants in Bankers Life did not fraudu-
lently induce an unfair purchase price or fail to pay a fair price for the
stock they purchased.4 They transacted a sale and paid-for the securities
with a check cashed later by Manhattan for the full and fair value.
However, the proceeds of the sale were misappropriated to cover the
check used by Begole and others to purchase the Manhattan stock. The
"in connection with" language of 1Ob-5 could be construed to include a
fraudulent scheme entailing a promise that value will be received for a
sale of securities and a subsequent misappropriation. However, the
lower courts held that such a construction was unwarranted in this case.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, felt that a lOb-5 action was
justified under a liberal construction of section lOb-5. 2 As one com-
mentator has concluded, the "in connection with" clause "is plainly
and-one must assume-intentionally the loosest linkage, in any of the
federal antifraud provisions, between a proscribed act and a security
transaction. 43 The Bankers Life Court pointed out that Congress did
not intend to regulate transactions amounting to no more than internal
corporate mismanagement," but the Court concluded that the misap-
propriation of funds was sufficiently "in connection with" the transac-
tion to warrant proscription. The importance of this conclusion is over-
shadowed by the approach taken to determine the standards to be ap-
plied to the "in connection with" clause. Although the Supreme Court
summarily declared that the fraud was used "in connection with" the
transaction, a comparison of its decision with that of the lower courts
"See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
4The court of appeals based its denial of a 10b-5 cause of action on the fact that the misrepre-
sentation did not involve the value of securities. 430 F.2d at 360-61. Although this was not a
widespread interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970); Allico Nat'I
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, 397 F.2d 727 (7th
Cir. 1968), the Supreme Court's reversal made it clear that such a test is too narrow. In fact, the
court of appeals decision in Bankers Life conflicts with its earlier decision that "[n]either § 10(b)
nor Rule 10b-5 contains any language which would indicate that those provisions were intended
to deal only with fraud as to the 'investment value' of securities, and, indeed, it is established that
a lOb-5 action will survive even though the fraudulent scheme or device is unrelated to 'investment
value.'" A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967).
"See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
431 A BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 7.6(1), at 190.21 (Supp. 1969-1).
"92 S. Ct. at 169.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50
will shed insight on the Court's analysis. The Court was satisfied that
"Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities . . . ."I The lower courts' requirements
that the purchase or sale of securities be at the crux of a fraudulent
scheme" or be the "sole object" of the fraud47 were rejected. Instead,
the Court emphasized the fact that lOb-5 encompasses schemes that
involve fraud even if the fraud is not of a type " 'usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities.' "48
The district court would not allow lOb-5 actions based on transac-
tions that were mere steps toward accomplishing the ultimate goal of
looting Manhattan's assets." In contrast, several courts had previously
held that misappropriation of the funds from a securities transaction
was sufficient for a lOb-5 cause of action.'" The theory of those cases
was that violators of lOb-5 should not be immunized from liability
merely because their violation is part of a broader scheme of misappro-
priation, even if corporate looting is the object or result of the fraud.5'
A 1Ob-5 action has been upheld as long as the "purchase or sale" is the
subject or the purpose of the scheme.52 The court of appeals in Bankers
Life erred in separating the transaction into a securities sale and a
subsequent misappropriation 3 because the entire series of events was
one unified scheme with the sale of securities an indispensable part.'
45Id. (emphasis added). The Court rejected defendant's contention that lob-5 liability would
result in federal preemption of state law governing corporate mismanagement.
11300 F. Supp. at 1101.
17430 F.2d at 360.
1192 S. Ct. at 168 n.7, quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967).
"The district court said that "Rule lob-5 requires the employment of fraud in connection with
a security transaction, which is essentially different from the effectuation of a security transaction
in connection with a fraudulent activity." 300 F. Supp. at 1102. The sale of Treasury bonds was
for the purpose of effecting the object of the conspiracy (looting Manhattan's assets), but a sale
not independently unlawful (lack of fraud) is not actionable under lOb-5. Id.
"0E.g., Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, 397 F.2d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
'2Herprich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1970).
"430 F.2d at 360. However, because both series of transactions (sale of securities and cov-
erup) were accomplished in a single day, it would have been more logical to conclude that the sale
transaction was at least an integral part of the scheme than to attempt to separate the sale from
the misappropriation.
51A similar analysis appeared in Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of North America, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968), in which the court sustained a lob-5
cause of action. Defendant breached a contract to sell stock to plaintiff when a better deal was
offered by a third party. In the process defendant misappropriated 25,000 shares of plaintiff's
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The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the "in connection
with" clause must be read in view of the unusual facts of the Bankers
Life case. The defendants had manipulated a highly complex series of
transactions to gain control of a corporation without expending any of
their own funds. The Court characterized the crux of the Bankers Life
case as being the injury suffered as a result of deceptive practices
"touching" its sale of securities. Thus characterized, the case may not
seem to support a conclusion that the requirements of the "in connec-
tion with" clause were liberalized. It could also be said that "but for ' 55
the securities transactions there would have been neither an injury nor
a workable scheme. The Court, based on the strong facts presented,
could have concluded that the fraudulent misappropriation was the
proximate cause or, at least, at the crux of the securities transaction or
could merely have differed from the lower courts' assessment of the
facts to hold that the misappropriation was not separable from the
securities transaction. 5 The fact that the Court re-evaluated the
"connection" necessary for 10b-5 and held that fraud "touching" the
transaction is sufficient indicates the liberality of the Court's interpreta-
tion of I Ob-5 and the increased scope of its use in the future.
To support a I Ob-5 action, there need only be a purchase or sale
of securities and fraud that "touches" any part of the transaction. Al-
though the limits of this "touching" have not been defined, clearly a
misappropriation of the corporation's assets to pay the purchase price
of its stock is sufficient. The nature of the fraud, the fact that the only
interests to be protected are those of creditors, and the participation in
the fraud of all the corporate decision makers are irrelevant. By treating
the transaction as a unified whole and not separable parts, the Court
stock, which defendant had held in escrow pending consumation of the deal. The court held that
lOb-5 jurisdiction existed because defendant's motivation included the misappropriation.
"In Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a court denied lOb-5 jurisdiction
despite allegations that defendants purchased the controlling stock by deception and committed
corporate waste. The court held that the deceptive acquisition of control was not the proximate
cause of the later mismanagement. See also Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1967).
5This interpretation was not without precedent in the lower courts. In Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court stated the issue to be whether lob-5
covers a case in which the security purchase "is a vital aspect of a continuing scheme [when]
plaintiff received his full value for the stock purchased but ultimately retained nothing as a result
of the fraudulent arrangement." Answering affirmatively, the court concluded that lob-5 is not
limited to the portion of the transaction involving the exchange of consideration. Id.
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protected a corporation's right to retain something of value from a sale
of securities.57
JOHN D. LOWERY
Truth In Lending-In Support of the Validity of the Regulation Z Four
Installment Rule
In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,' the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt a blow to consumer protection by
holding invalid the four installment rule of Regulation Z,2 a regulation
promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
pursuant to Title I (Truth in Lending) of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act. Under Regulation Z the disclosure requirements4 of Truth
in Lending are made applicable to "consumer credit," defined in the
regulation as "credit offered or extended. . . for which either a finance
charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an agreement, is or
may be payable in more than four installments."5 The court of appeals
held that promulgation of the so-called "four installment rule" was
beyond-the authority granted the Board of Governors by Congress and
that the rule created a conclusive presumption in violation of the due
7The Fifth Circuit adopted a similarly practical approach to the scope of lOb-5 liability in
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.. 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961): "Considering the purpose of lOb-5, it would be unrealistic to say that a corporation
having the capacity to acquire $700,000 worth of assets for its 700,000 shares of stock has suffered
no loss if what it gave up was $700,000 but what it got was zero."
1449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1248 (1972). Two student writers have
noted this decision. Note, Consumer Protection-Credit-Administrative Law-Constitutional
Law-Federal Reserve Board Regulation Requiring Disclosure of Credit Terms Any Time Con-
sumer Transaction Involves Four or More Installments Exceeds Authority Granted the Board by
Truth In Lending Act and Violates Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 876 (1971), strongly criticizes the decision and Note, The Four-Installment Rule of Regula-
tion Z Exceeds the Scope of Authority Granted by the Truth In Lending Act and Creates an
Irrebuttable Presumption Prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, 9 Hous. L. REv. 552 (1972),
generally supports it.
212 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1971).
315 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
'Truth in Lending Act §§ 127-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-38 (1970). Under the Act's disclosure
provisions, full disclosure of credit terms must be made to the consumer prior to the consummation
of the credit transaction. The Act requires disclosure both where open-ended credit is involved (e.g.,
credit cards and revolving credit plans) and where credit other than open-ended credit is involved.
-12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1971) (emphasis added).
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process clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution.' It is submit-
ted that, contrary to the holding, the four installment rule is consistent
with the congressional grant of legislative rule-making power 7 and cre-
ates a valid rule of substantive law independent of any presumption that
a finance charge is present in every installment credit transaction.
Under the suggested interpretation, the rule simply requires the disclo-
sure of credit terms in every consumer credit transaction in which the
agreement allows payment in more than four installments, whether or
not a finance charge is imposed.'
Family Publications Service, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
business of soliciting subscriptions for well-known periodicals, con-
tracted with Leila Mourning, an elderly widow, for the sale and delivery
of four popular periodicals. The contract required the payment of thirty
monthly installments of 3.95 dollars each in return for the right to
receive the periodicals for sixty months. The agreement contained no
disclosure of the total purchase price, finance charge, or the amount
financed.' After Mrs. Mourning's default, Family Publications at-
tempted to collect the full contract price. In response to these collection
efforts, Mrs. Mourning filed a civil suit in federal district court asserting
that Family Publications had failed to make the disclosures required by
the Truth in Lending Act and requesting the civil penalty'0 and attor-
'449 F.2d at 242-43.
7See Strompolos v. Premium Readers Serv., 326 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. I11. 1971).
The disclosure provisions of the Act are inapplicable to physicians, attorneys, and others who
give credit without imposing a finance charge so long as repayment is not made pursuant to
agreement in more than four installments. Certain advisory opinions of the Board of Governors
which are considered of general interest are published by Commerce Clearing House in Volume 4
of the CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE. The staff opinions found at 30,180 and 30,434 of the
GUIDE emphasize that the Board does not consider the mere fact of payment in more than four
installments, in the absence of a specific agreement allowing such payment, sufficient to invoke
the disclosure provisions of the Act. Moreover, acceptance of partial payments would not consti-
tute an agreement. See Legal Problems of Consumer Credit, 4 U.C.D.L. REv. 261 (1971), for a
discussion of the impact of the Act on attorneys.
'Family Publications argued that the subscription contract was not subject to the Truth-in-
Lending Act because there was no extension of credit. The district court concluded that credit was
extended because "[tlhe Plaintiff received a present contract right-a subscription, in exchange for
a promise to pay a certain sum in more than four installments." Mourning v. Family Publications
Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,632 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 449 F.2d 235 (5th
Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit did not expressly answer the question of whether credit was extended.
However, since a finding that there was no extension of credit would have allowed the court to
overturn the conviction without reaching the constitutional issue or the question of scope of
authority, it apparently concluded that credit was in fact extended.
"0Truth in Lending Act § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) sets the amount of the civil
penalty at "twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction," except that
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ney's fees" prescribed by the Act. The district court granted her motion
for summary judgment after finding that "the transaction here in ques-
tion falls squarely within the scope of the [Truth in Lending] Act and
its Regulations by virtue of the 'more than four installments' rule
"12
The Truth in Lending Act was signed into law on May 29, 1968,
as one of five parts of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.'
It requires certain disclosures by creditors involved in consumer credit
transactions, regulates certain credit advertising,' and renders rescind-
able certain transactions which involve a security interest in the con-
sumer's residence." The Act does not attempt to regulate charges for
consumer credit; it merely requires disclosure of credit terms. The con-
sumer must then decide for himself whether the credit terms offered are
fair and acceptable.
In section 105 of the Act, Congress delegated to the Board broad
powers to promulgate regulations to prevent circumvention or evasion
of the Act. 17 The necessity and constitutionality of the delegation of rule-
making power is well settled.' In determining the force to be given rules
issued pursuant to rule-making authority, many commentators " and
a maximum and minimum penalty of $1,000 and $100, respectively, is imposed. Criminal penalties
for the wilful and knowing failure of a creditor to make the required disclosure of credit informa-
tion are provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
"Truth in Lending Act § 130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
"Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,632 at
89,607 (S.D. Fla. 1970). But see Castaneda v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 91 99,564 at 89,521 (D. Colo. 1971).
"aSee R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL 2-6 (rev. ed. 1970) for a concise history of
the Act and Regulation Z.
"Truth in Lending Act § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970).
151d. §§ 141-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-65.
"Id. § 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1635.
"Id. § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604.
"in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946), the Supreme Court said:
The legislative process would frequently bog down if Congress were constitutionally
required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a particular
policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for each situation. Necessity there-
fore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress
to prescribe detailed rules; it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly
delineates a general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of this delegated authority.
"E.g., Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. REv.
477, 505, 527 (1945); Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1311, 1320
(1941); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398,400,411 (194 1).
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courts 0 distinguish between interpretive rules, which are not binding
upon the courts, and legislative rules, which are binding. For example,
Treasury Regulations, which are issued by the Internal Revenue Service
to advise the public of the Service's construction of the Revenue Code,
are interpretive only and are not binding upon the courts.
21
A legislative rule, as defined by Professor Davis in his treatise on
administrative law,
is the product of an exercise of legislative power by an agency, pur-
suant to a grant (whether explicit or not) of legislative power by the
legislative body; a court will no more substitute judgment on the con-
tent of a valid legislative rule than it will substitute judgment on the
content of a valid statute.
22
Thus, the crucial difference between an interpretive and a legislative rule
is the greater authoritative weight a legislative rule merits by virtue of
being issued pursuant to law-making authority.
Congress delegated broad rule-making powers to the Federal Re-
serve Board to promulgate regulations which would not only offer guid-
ance to creditors in complying with the disclosure requirements of the
Truth in Lending Act but also prevent evasion or circumvention of the
Act.2 The Regulation Z four installment rule was created to effectuate
this latter purpose. If the four installment rule is consistent with the
express purpose of the Act and the congressional delegation of regula-
tory power, it should be sustained by the courts as a valid exercise of
legislative rule-making authority.
The Board's factual basis for determining the necessity for the four
installment rule is part of its delegated legislative function and is not
subject to review by the courts.24 The rule itself is presumed to be valid
unless "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the statute. ' 2 One
"E.g., United States v. California Portland Cement Co., 413 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir. 1969);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964); American President Lines v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Duke Molner Wholesale Liquor Co.
v. Martin, 180 Cal. App. 2d 873, 4 Cal. Rptr. 904, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
"General authority to issue interpretive regulations is given the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(a). However, Congress has also delegated to
the Secretary specific authority in certain Code sections to issue binding rules. E.g., INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 1501-05 (consolidated returns). See Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rul-
ings, Reliance and Retroactivity. 43 TAXES 756, 758-60 (1965).
22 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.11, at 358 (1958) (emphasis added).
2zTruth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
21See United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940).
2'Review Comm. v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 827 (1960).
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attacking the rule has the heavy burden of persuading the court that the
Board has exceeded its authority and employed means inappropriate to
the congressional purpose for passing the Act.21 In authorizing the
Board to regulate to prevent circumvention of the Act, Congress clearly
manifested an intent to delegate adequate power to deal with the numer-
ous practices which would avoid the technical language of the Act.27 The
Fifth Circuit sought to overcome the presumption of the validity of the
rule by invoking the maxim that penal statutes must be strictly con-
strued.28 The civil enforcement provision 2 of the Act, however, is pri-
marily regulatory and remedial ° in nature-not punitive. It serves to
encourage aggrieved debtors to initiate civil actions to protect their right
to disclosure and to bring pressure on creditors to conform to the re-
quirements of the Act. The criminal liability provision 31 of the Act is
applicable only when a creditor knowingly and willfully gives false infor-
mation or no information. All Board regulations are incorporated by
reference into the criminal liability provision and thus creditors are put
on notice of the disclosure requirements. Although the penal provision
should be strictly construed to protect unwitting violators, the same
strict construction is inapplicable to the civil liability provision.
The necessity for the rule is clear in view of the expanding use of
consumer credit in the United States.32 The thrust of the Act is to
encourage consumers to "credit shop" and thereby encourage competi-
tion among creditors.3 3 The informed use of credit by consumers
would have the dual effect of enabling consumers to maximize the bene-
fit received from each dollar spent for credit and of discouraging decep-
tive credit practices by placing unscrupulous merchants at an economic
disadvantage. Merchants who inflate cash prices in order to minimize
stated finance charges would lose sales to merchants who offer lower
total prices. The fatal flaw in the Act is that in the absence of the four
installment rule, merchants could evade the Act by inflating cash prices
and ostensibly charging nothing for the extension of credit. In the ab-
sence of disclosure of total price and schedule of payments, many con-
261d.
2TTruth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
2449 F.2d at 240.
-Truth in Lending Act § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
-'Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
31Truth in Lending Act § 112, 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
1See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-13 (1968).
uTruth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
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sumers would be misled by advertisements stressing low monthly pay-
ments and "free" credit. This is the kind of deceptive practice the rule
seeks to prohibit.
The Board apparently felt the four installment rule was necessary
(1) to discourage the "burying" of finance charges in inflated cash
prices34 and (2) to force disclosure of credit terms such as total cost and
schedule of payments in installment credit sales in which no finance
charge is imposed.3 5 Indeed, the rule is seemingly consonant with the
congressional purpose of "assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms.1 36 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit ignored congressional intent
to delegate broad legislative rule-making powers and invalidated the
rule as an unauthorized attempt by the Board to amend the law. While
it is evident that Congress was primarily concerned with forcing disclo-
sure of credit terms in transactions in which credit charges were ex-
pressly imposed, Congress also included within the coverage of the Act
consumer credit transactions which involve hidden finance charges37
and, through regulations issued by the Board, transactions fashioned in
such a manner as to attempt to evade the provisions of the Act.3 In
construing the scope of authority granted the Board, the courts should
heed the language of Lord Coke in Heydon's Case, decided almost four
hundred years ago, and give the statute such "construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and. . suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief. . . and...
add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act . . .,,3
As an alternative ground for overturning the four installment rule,
the Fifth Circuit held that the rule created an unconstitutional "conclu-
sive presumption that those who extend credit and permit payment in
four or more installments have added a finance charge for the extension
"Letter from J.L. Robertson, December 2, 1969, in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE 1 30,228, at 66,103 (1972).
"Letter from J.L. Robertson, October 9, 1969, in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,180,
at 66,078 (1972).
31Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
17d. § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1970).
3RAccord, Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). In Gemsco the Fair Labor Standards
Act gave the administrator the power to issue orders he found necessary to carry out minimum-
wage orders or to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof. Violation of the orders was criminally
punishable. An order prohibiting "homework" in the embroidery industry was held valid as neces-
sary to prevent evasion of the minimum-wage requirements.
1'3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
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of credit."4 The decision rests upon the conclusion that a finance charge
must necessarily be found in the credit transaction for the disclosure
provisions of the Act to be applicable.4 If the foregoing analysis of the
scope of the Board's rule-making power is accurate, that conclusion by
the court is erroneous. The four installment rule does not create a
factual presumption that a finance charge exists; it extends the Act to
include factual. situations in which, in the judgment of the Board, disclo-
sure is necessary to prevent circumvention of the purposes of the Act."
If the congressional grant of authority to issue regulations is broad
enough to permit such an extension of the Act, the rule clearly creates
no presumption and the court's attack on its constitutionality is ground-
less.
The tax cases43 cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of its holding
that the four installment rule creates an unconstitutional conclusive
presumption are inapposite. In those cases legislation purported to tax
as gifts made in contemplation of death all gratuitous transfers made
within a certain period prior to death, without regard to the donor's
actual motivation. The Supreme Court held the presumption impermis-
sible since the death of the donor within the designated period following
the gift was considered by the Court insufficient evidence of the donor's
state of mind at the time of the gift to support a conclusive presumption
concerning the donor's motivations. The four installment rule does not
presume the existence of a finance charge; it necessitates disclosure
without regard to the existence of a finance charge where consumer
credit is, by agreement, repayable in more than four installments.
The Fifth Circuit's invalidation of the four installment rule has
given rise to the possibility that the Truth in Lending Act will be ren-
dered practically a nullity in some areas of consumer credit.44 The mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms will hardly be encouraged by a law
11449 F.2d at 240.
1
Id.
41See Note, 40 U. CIN. L. REV., supra note 1, at 879.
4Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
"In the 1971 FED. RESERVE SYSTEM BD. OF GOVERNORS ANN. REP. ON TRUTH-IN-LENDING
21, the Board communicated its concern to Congress that court invalidation of the four installment
rule could mean the subsequent invalidation of the Act's provisions on credit advertising and home
improvement sales involving a security interest in the consumer's residence. While these provisions
are not expressly limited in application to transactions involving a finance charge, they might be
interpreted as applying only to "creditors." Creditors are, in turn, covered by the Act only if they
regularly extend credit for which a finance charge is or may be imposed. Thus, coverage under the
Act could be avoided by "burying" any finance charge imposed on the sale.
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which can be circumvented by the "burying" of finance charges, since
such a law would permit merchants to decide for themselves whether
they will be subject to its disclosure provisions. Unless the four install-
ment rule is validated by subsequent court decision 5 as a legitimate
exercise of legislative rule-making power, or some similar rule is enacted
by Congress, " the Truth in Lending Act may in the future operate to
the detriment, rather than to the benefit, of many credit consumers.,7
JOSEPH E. WALL
" The United States Supreme Court has accepted certiorari to determine the validity of the
four installment rule. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 92 S. Ct. 1248 (1972).
'The Board has recommended congressional enactment of the four installment rule. 1971 FED.
RI:SERVE SYSTEMi BD. OF GOVERNORS ANN. REP. ON TRUTH-IN-LENDING 22. In order to avoid
litigation on the presumption issue, such legislation should be clearly applicable to consumer credit
repayable by agreement in installments regardless of whether a finance charge is imposed.
"The ultimate fate of the four installment rule will have repercussions on the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act passed by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1971. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A
(Supp. 1971). That Act sets maximum interest rates on consumer credit sales, defined in § 25A-2
as "the sale of goods or services in which . . . (4) Either the debt representing the price of the
goods or services is payable in installments or a finance charge is imposed .... " In § 25A-3 the
Act says that "A debt is 'payable in installments' when the buyer is required or permitted by
agreement to make payment in more than four installments, excluding a down payment, and
whether or not a finance charge is imposed by the seller." However, § 25A-1 of the Act provides
that the Act "does not apply to any party or transaction that is not also subject to the provisions
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (Federal Truth-in-Lending Act)." Consequently, unless the
General Assembly deletes this limitation, the applicability of the Retail Installment Sales Act to
consumer credit repayable in installments will be conditioned upon the validity of the Regulation
Z four installment rule.
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This issue of the North Carolina Law Review is dedicated to
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the School of Law.
